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Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis consists of three essays on Labour Economics and the Economics
of Education, having the goal of contributing to the scientific discussion and shed
new light on a number of empirical questions.
The remaining of the chapter presents a general motivation for the study, to-
gether with the main findings and policy implications, which are fully developed
throughout the thesis.
Motivation
There is an ongoing debate in Economics of Education on the merits and drawbacks
of school choice as opposed to a community-based model, where schools only serve
the local neighbourhood.
Advocates of school choice base their arguments on the economic theory of mar-
ket efficiency. First, a more market oriented education system should improve
the match between pupils and schools. In this sense, allowing families to select
schools on the basis of their preferences and teaching needs should result in an
improvement in the average academic achievement. Moreover, increased choice
should help breaking the link between residential and school segregation induced
by a community-based model, with wealthier families living in more affluent neigh-
bourhoods also attending the best schools. The benefits of choice should be even
more pronounced for low income children who are typically segregated in poor
neighbourhoods served by low quality schools (Gibbons et al., 2008). Second,
school choice is believed to have beneficial effects also on school performance.
Indeed, community-based schools operate in an almost monopolistic market, im-
plying little incentives to innovate and improve teaching performance. In a world
1
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where parents have strong preferences for quality, a choice based model would in-
crease competition among schools with the ultimate result of boosting performance
(Hastings et al., 2005; Burgess et al., 2009; Gibbons and Silva, 2011).
On the other hand, scholars in favour of a community-school model claim that
teachers are more likely to perform well in a more stable environment with rel-
atively low turnover. Moreover, greater choice would replace the link between
neighbourhood and school segregation with sorting across schools on the basis of
family background characteristics. In this sense, they advocate that it would be
more desirable to stick to a community-based model and improve the performance
of lower quality schools via redistribution of resources.
The first two chapters of this thesis aim at shading additional light on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of school choice models. Specifically, I explore the effects
of a programme introduced in the UK, which aimed at increasing choice among
low income families, on both students’ choices and school behaviour.
The third chapter addresses a different empirical question. Typically, when work-
ers are rewarded on the basis of team effort the possibility arises that individuals
free ride. However, past literature emphasised the importance of externalities
when groups of agents are concerned. Specifically, group effects such as social
pressure or shame may be strong enough to completely offset free riding (Kandel
and Lazear, 1992; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Using Italian social security data on
private sector employees, the last chapter contributes to the existing literature by
exploring externalities in workers’ shirking, which I recover from information on
sick leave episodes.
Main results
Chapter 1: One the Way Down: the Unintended Conse-
quences of School Transport Subsidies
In the past, especially in the US, free transport to school has been used as a
tool to decrease school segregation and improve the quality of education among
disadvantaged students (Billings and Rockoff, 2014; Katz et al., 2001).
The chapter examines a policy reform that occurred in England in academic year
2007/2008 (Free Transport policy), which provided monetary incentives to low
2
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socio-economic status (SES) students to attend further away secondary schools.
In particular, the policy supplied free transport to any of the three closest schools
at a distance of at least two miles from home, with the explicit goal of improving
choice and, eventually, the quality of the school attended by low income pupils.
A simple model shows that while this policy should create incentives for low SES
students to attend further away schools, its effect on the quality of the school
attended is ambiguous and it might even reduce it. This happens if households
are willing to trade school quality for lower travel cost. The mechanism is further
enhanced by the fact that families are de facto not free to choose. Due to over-
subscription of most popular schools and distance-based admission criteria, the
ultimate “compliers” may indeed be those ending up in low quality institutions.
Using confidential panel school micro data, providing information on the postcode
of both schools and students’ residence, I identify the effect of the policy on school
choice through a difference-in-difference approach comparing students who are
eligible for the programme with those who are not. Consistent with the intended
objectives of the policy, I find strong evidence of an increase in enrolment into more
distant schools. Interestingly, though, there is no improvement in the quality of
the school attended.
Chapter 2: School Competition and Performance
The chapter investigates the effects of the Free Transport policy on schools and
school behaviour. Simple economic reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that
an increase in school choice should lead to an improvement in performance through
competitive pressure. Clearly, this happens if money follows the pupil, i.e. incen-
tives are enough high power. In order to assess the impact of the policy on school
performance, I investigate precisely these three margins.
This chapter proceeds by first testing whether the introduction of free transport
has an effect on school enrollment, i.e. if higher competitive pressure results in an
actual decrease in student numbers. Estimates suggest that enrollment declines
more in schools which were more affected by the policy. Second, the chapter looks
at the impact of the policy on school resources. Results confirm that funds do
decrease in response to the decline in enrolment numbers almost perfectly, sug-
gesting that schools do operate in a quasi-market environment and have financial
incentives to attract additional students.
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Finally, I explore the impact of increased competition on school performance. I
show that the policy has the effect of slightly improving quality, measured as test
scores of students in Year 11. These results are consistent with the argument that
competition among schools improves performance, though findings are economi-
cally modest.
Chapter 3: Externalities at the Workplace: Evidence from
the Italian Private Sector
This chapter uses matched employer-employee microdata on a sample of Italian
private sector workers to estimate how co-workers’ behaviour affects the individ-
ual propensity to shirk. The analysis is closely related to the paper of Mas and
Moretti (2009), providing evidence of positive spillovers among workers in a large
supermarket. Differently from their work, however, I focus on the more common
context of team work, where workers contribute to production jointly rather than
individually.
Identifying shirking is challenging, as obviously it is not recorded in the data.
Nonetheless, there is a large amount of evidence showing that, when sick leave is
covered by public insurance as in Italy, workers’ absences often cover shirking. I
hence circumvent the problem by using workers’ absence rate as a proxy.
Empirically, the identification of group effects relies on the arguably exogenous
variation in groups’ absenteeism due to new co-workers joining the establishment
(movers). Employing a two stages approach, I estimate movers’ absenteeism net
of other characteristics and use it as a proxy for co-workers’ shirking. Results
show that workers tend to emulate their peers, increasing their absence rates in
response to more absenteeist co-workers.
Conclusions and policy implications
All in all, the goal of this thesis is to contribute to two main strands of the
existing literature: the one on school choice and competition and the one on




The first chapter shows how well meaning policies aiming at increasing school
choice among disadvantaged pupils may have the unintended effect of lowering the
average quality of the school attended. In order to achieve the goal of improving
access to high quality schools, it is essential to carefully determine a priori what
are the incentives families will face, as well as the institutional barriers that may
prevent the success of such policies. Specifically, in the case under analysis two
concerns emerge. First, given the subsidy’s conditionality on distance, the policy
creates incentives to apply to further away schools even if there is no gain in
terms of quality. Second, high quality schools are likely to be oversubscribed. As
distance is the main criteria for admission, the choice of school for students eligible
for free transport may de facto be limited to poor quality schools. In light of this,
future research may include exploring alternative ways to promote school choice.
One may think, for instance, of extending the subsidy to any secondary school
in order to avoid the distortionary incentives induced by distance conditionality.
Alternatively, free transport could be restricted to more distant schools which
are of higher quality compared to the one nearby. Finally, to overcome the over-
subscription problem, one might consider the introduction of special quotas for
low income students in most popular, high quality schools.
The second chapter outlines how increased competition among schools does not im-
prove teaching quality significantly, results being small and economically modest.
In particular, competition does not seem to lead to the desired effect of boosting
substantially schools’ performance. Though the small results could be explained
by the limited “bite” of the policy under analysis, these findings are in line with
other studies exploring the UK context. Overall, the evidence provided in this
chapter confirms the empirical evidence that competitive pressure may not be a
powerful tool to improve school quality. In this sense, policies aiming at promoting
school accountability may represent a potentially more promising ground.
Finally, the last chapter shows the presence of positive externalities in shirking. In
particular, workers respond to absenteeist co-workers by increasing their absences.
Overall, results suggest that when monitoring is not perfect, a negative shock in the
composition of peers may have significant repercussions on workers’ productivity.
This is especially true in large establishment, where the employment protection
legislation is more stringent. In this sense, if the goal is to discourage workers
from shirking , a more transparent law regulating sick leave may be desirable.
Altogether, this thesis should be viewed as a departing point, which I hope will
foster the economic debate on the role played by the aforementioned factors.
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On the Way Down:
The Unintended Consequences of
School Transport Subsidies
1.1 Introduction
According to the National Transport Survey (NTS)1, in 2009 more than 50% of
British households in the bottom quintile of the income distribution did not own
a car or van, compared with only 10% in the top income group. Low rates of
car ownership imply that families will need to rely on public transports if their
children are enrolled in schools beyond walking distance, with a significant im-
pact on both the time and monetary cost of attending school.2 The high cost of
travelling, together with distance-based admission criteria, mean that low income
students residing in isolated neighbourhoods de facto do not have access to the
best institutions.3
1The NTS is the primary source of data on personal travel patterns in Great Britain. It is
designed to monitor long-term trends in personal travel and to inform the development of policy.
The survey collects information on how, why, when and where people travel as well as factors
affecting travel (e.g. car availability and drivers’ holding). https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/national-travel-survey-statistics.
2 On average, tickets fares for children aged under 16 are £1 for a single short journey, £1.20
for a medium length journey and £1.40 for a long journey.
3In principle, school admission policies are not based on geographic zoning, implying that
students could potentially apply to and attend any secondary school in the country. Nonetheless,
low income students usually attend the school nearby, which is typically of lower quality compared
to the national average. Gibbons et al. (2012) provide compelling evidence of how house prices
are correlated with school quality: using a regression discontinuity approach, they show that a
one standard deviation increase in the school’s value added or raw test scores increases house
6
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Improving access to good schools seems to be a promising tool to decrease seg-
regation and promote social mobility. Indeed, though pupils’ innate ability and
parental background explain a large share of academic achievement, the quality
of the school attended is believed to be crucial in determining academic success
and future labour market outcomes (Card, 1992; Dearden et al., 2002a; Kramarz
et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2011).4
One way to achieve this goal is to decrease the cost of transport to school. The
focus of this paper is a unique policy innovation which occurred in England in the
academic year 2007/2008, providing monetary incentives to low income students
to attend schools beyond walking distance. Although transport subsides have
always existed in the UK, in 2007/2008 they became particularly generous for
low socio-economic status (SES) students -i.e. those eligible for free school meals
(FSME) or whose parents are in receipt of benefits.5 In particular, it extended
the right to free transport to any of the three closest schools at a distance of at
least 2 miles and no more than 6 miles from home. The rationales of this policy
(Free Transport policy), though with important differences, resemble two kind of
programmes adopted in the past: the US desegregation policies, aiming at reducing
school segregation of racial minorities, and school choice programmes, having the
objective of increasing families’ choice set.
prices by 3%. For additional evidence on the link between housing market prices and school
quality see also Black (1999), Hoxby (2000), Rothstein (2006), Fack and Grenet (2010) and
Machin and Salvanes (2010).
4Compelling evidence comes from the newly introduced academy schools in England, which
are showed to improve the share of pupils achieving at least five grades in range A*-C in their
GCSE/GNVQ (Machin and Wilson, 2009; Machin and Vernoit, 2010). More recent literature
focuses on the impact of the newly introduced charter schools in the US. These schools aim at
promoting teaching quality emphasizing traditional reading and math skills, extended instruc-
tion time and selective teachers hiring. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) show that oversubscribed
charter schools in Boston increase the test scores of low income students by a third of a stan-
dard deviation per year -enough to eliminate the black-white test score gap in a few years of
attendance. In a follow-up of this paper, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) show that Boston char-
ter attendance boosted SAT scores sharply, along with the probability of taking an Advanced
Placement examination. Similar effects have been found in New York City (Dobbie and Fryer,
2011). For additional evidence on the benefits on charter schools see also Hoxby and Murarka
(2009), Dobbie and Roland G. Fryer (2011) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011). However, the
literature on charter schools is not completely unanimous. Both Ravitch (2010) and Rothstein
(2004) criticize the external validity of studies on charter schools, pointing out that those schools
are more likely to select students from the top of the ability distribution those children with in-
nate intelligence and well motivated parents. Other studies using as a proxy of school quality
by various observable indicators, such as teacher/pupil ratio, teachers’ educations and per-pupil
expenditures, find mixed results on the link with students’ achievement (Hanushek, 1986, 2003;
Krueger, 1999, 2003; Chetty et al., 2014).
5Benefits include: income-based Job-seekers Allowance, Income-related Employment and Sup-
port Allowance, Support under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, Child Tax
Credit (provided one is not also entitled to Working Tax Credit and has an annual gross income
of no more than £16,190) and the guaranteed element of State Pension Credit.
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Concerning the former, past literature generally connected the implementation of
school desegregation programmes with a number of positive outcomes (Guryan,
2004; Reber, 2010; Billings and Rockoff, 2014).6 Nonetheless, there are important
exceptions: the Moving to Opportunity relocation of low SES families across the
US, for instance, did not seem to be effective in improving children’s academic
achievement. (Katz et al., 2001; De Luca and Rosenblatt, 2010; Ludwig et al.,
2013). Though the Free Transport policy shares with these policies the ultimate
goal of improving access for low SES families to high quality education , it differs
from the majority of school desegregation programmes as it is not conditional on
attendance of a pre-assigned school.
With respect to school choice interventions, there is plenty of evidence showing
how English pupils from disadvantaged families are disproportionally sorted in
poorly performing institutions (Burgess et al., 2004; Allen, 2007; Burgess et al.,
2008, 2010; Fitz et al., 2003; Allen and Vignoles, 2006; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2007),
though little is known on whether improved school choice would help promoting
access to best schools. Past literature exploring parents’ preferences revealed that,
on average, families do value academic attainment as one of the most important
school characteristics (Hastings et al., 2005; Burgess et al., 2009; Gibbons and
Silva, 2011), suggesting that expanding families’ choice set should translate into a
higher fraction of students attending high quality institutions.7 Empirical evidence
on this, however, is mostly limited to the US context. Among others, Cullen et al.
(2005) explore the impact of introducing open enrolment within the Chicago Public
Schools (CPS). Roughly half of the students opt out of their assigned high school
to attend career academies and other high-achieving schools, and these students
6Guryan (2004) finds a 3 percentage points reduction in drop out rates for black students,
while no effect is found for white students. Similarly, Reber (2010) shows that schools desegrega-
tion increased graduation rates among black students by 15 %. Ashenfelter et al. (2005) report a
positive effect of desegregation on long term outcomes of black students, finding that blacks who
finished their schooling just before effective desegregation occurred fared poorly compared to
blacks who followed just a few years behind them at school. Finally, Billings and Rockoff (2014)
show that the rezoning following the end of busing sensibly widened racial inequality despite
the effort of local schools to mitigate the impacts of increased segregation through an increase
in the resources invested in education. Students reassigned to high minority schools displayed
persistently lower grades at graduation, lower college attendance and higher crime rates. Con-
cerning studies outside the US, Lavy (2010) studies the effect of the end of inter-district busing
in Tel-Aviv public schools. Similarly to the US, before 1994 students’ assignment to secondary
schools was motivated by social and ethnic integration and included busing of some pupils across
the city’s schooling districts. The 1994 programme terminated the previous system and granted
families access to all secondary schools, both within and outside the district. He finds that
affected students displayed lower drop out rates and significantly higher cognitive achievement
than unaffected children. Moreover, non-academic outcomes, such as students’ satisfaction and
social acclimation, improved as a result of the better match between students and schools.
7Families also value pupils’ composition and distance, the latter being generally more relevant
for students with lower socio-economic backgrounds.
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are much more likely to graduate than those who remain in their assigned schools.8
Similarly, Deming et al. (2014) explore the effect of winning an admissions lottery
to attend a public high school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (CMS), showing that
lottery winners are more likely than lottery losers to graduate from high school and
to attend college, and that the positive impacts of choice are strongly predicted by
gains on several measures of school quality.9 10 With respect to the UK, Gibbons
et al. (2008) show that pupils who have a wider choice of schools at their place of
residence perform no better than those with more limited choice. Though closely
related to school choice programmes, however, the Free Transport policy differs
from these policies in being the first intervention of this kind conditioning choice
on distance to school.
A simple model shows that, while this policy should create incentives for low
SES student to attend schools further away, its effect on the quality of the school
attended is ambiguous and it might even reduce it. This follows from the fact that
some students might be induced to trade school quality with savings in the cost
of transport. The mechanism is further enhanced by school over-subscription and
distance-based admission criteria that could de facto limit choice to lower quality,
less popular schools.11
Using a unique dataset on the universe of England’s students providing information
on both pupils’ postcode of residence and school history, I identify the effect of the
policy on school choices through a differences-in-differences approach, comparing
8Cullen and Jacob (2007) examine whether expanded access to sought-after schools in the
CPS can improve academic achievement. Using lottery data, they find that winners attend on
average higher quality schools than lottery losers. However, they do not find that winning the
lottery systematically confers any evident academic benefit.
9For additional evidence on the effects of CMS open enrolment see, among the others, Hastings
et al. (2006) and Hastings et al. (2007).
10A different strand of the literature examines the impact on school choice of school vouchers,
which decrease the cost of attending private schools. In 1990 Wisconsin began providing a small
number of low income families with vouchers to attend non sectarian private schools. Greene
et al. (1996, 1997) and compare the test scores of students who won the lottery with those
who lost, finding significant gains in both math and reading scores. Rouse (1998) compares the
test scores of students selected to attend a private school with those of all other students from
Milwaukee public schools. She finds that the program had a positive impact on math score gains
of selected students. Other studies on the effects of the Milwaukee Voucher Program include:
Witte (1992), Witte et al. (1995), Witte and Thorn (1996), Witte (1997). Finally, Angrist et al.
(2002) explore the effects of a voucher programme in Columbia, offering vouchers which partially
covered the cost of private secondary school for students who maintained satisfactory academic
progress. Three years after the lotteries, winners were about 10 percentage points more likely to
have finished 8th grade, primarily because they were less likely to repeat grades, and scored 0.2
standard deviations higher on achievement tests.
11 Compelling evidence on the relevance of the proximity criterion is provided by Burgess et al.
(2010), showing that it accounts for up to two thirds of the overall observed difference in the
quality of the school attended.
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low SES students living in postcodes eligible for free transport (i.e. with at least
one of the 3 closest schools over 2 miles and below 6 miles) in the post reform
period with those ineligible (i.e. those for whom the three closest schools are all
below 2 miles). As eligibility for the programme is based on walking distances,
I computed the shortest route between pupils’ postcodes and schools’ postcodes
using the Geographic Information System (GIS). Furthermore, I use students’
postcodes measured prior to the entrance into secondary school (i.e. in their
last year of primary school), to alleviate the concern stemming from families’
endogenous mobility.
Consistent with the intended objectives of the policy, I find strong evidence of an
increase in the probability of FSME students enrolling at more distant schools, in
the order of 2 percentage points. This, however, does not result in an improve in
quality, with eligible students enrolling at schools between 0.02 and 0.03 standard
deviations lower in quality than ineligible ones. Exploring the potential mecha-
nisms, my results show that a crucial role is played by school over-subscription
which limits the access to more distant, high quality schools. Overall, these find-
ings suggest that the introduction of free transport did not yield the desired effect
of improving the quality of the school attended by low SES students.
This chapter unfolds as follows: in sections 1.2 and 1.3 I briefly discuss the institu-
tional background and present basic descriptive evidence. Section 1.4 introduces
a simple model of school choice with free transport to school. Sections 1.5 and 1.6
present the identification strategy and show results of the effect of the programme
on the outcome variables of interest. The last section summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Background
This paper focuses on public school students in their transition from primary to
secondary school. Compulsory primary education in England covers ages 5 to 16.12
The National Curriculum is divided into four Key Stages: Key Stage 1 (ages 5 to
7), Key Stage 2 (ages 7 to 11), Key Stage 3 (ages 11 to 14) and Key Stage 4 (ages
14 to 16).13
12There is no grade retention in England, so age corresponds to school grade.
13A second route available to students consists of a three tier track with students enrolling in
primary school at age 6-9, in middle school at age 9-13 and in secondary school from then on.
However, even if very popular in the 80’s, the number of middle schools started declining already
in the early 90’s and nowadays only a negligible fraction of students follows this path (roughly
5% of the whole population).
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In the Spring at the end of each Key Stage (KS) students are assessed in three
compulsory subjects, mathematics, English and science, either by teacher assess-
ment (in Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 3) or by standard national tests (SATS, in
Key Stage 2).14 At the end of KS4, though not mandatory, most students take the
General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE),15 the minimum requirement
being to sit national examinations in mathematics, English and science.16
School admission to both primary and secondary schools is based on the principle
of free parental choice: parents can apply to any school, regardless of their Local
Authority (LA) of residence (roughly comparable to New York City’s Boroughs).
The only limit to parents’ free choice is over-subscription of the most popular
schools. In this case admissions are determined on the basis of the schools’ own
criteria, which must be non-discriminatory according to the Department for Ed-
ucation’s guidelines. Generally, schools give priority to: (1) pupils with special
education needs (SEN), (2) students who have siblings already at the school and
(3) students who live close by.17 Some schools, namely grammar schools, may
select students on the basis of their ability. However, the share of these schools is
negligible.
Every year LAs’ websites publish an up-to-date list of the schools available within
their boundaries, along with all the steps needed to complete the application pro-
cess.18 Parents are provided with very rich information on the characteristics of
available schools. In particular, every school is required to publish on its web-
site detailed information on past performances (“performance tables”), typically
Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4 attainment measures, and additional statistics, such
as the pupil/teacher ratio and pupils’ ethnic composition. Even if the criteria
to complete the performance tables have been reviewed almost every year, mea-
sures of pupils’ achievement in both mathematics and English have always been
14Evaluation of Key Stage 3 became teacher-assessed in the academic year 2008/2009.
15Roughly 95% of students in Key Stage 4 take the final examinations. This is also an essential
requirement to access higher education. Moreover, virtually all universities set requirements on
additional subjects to be taken at GCSE level, as well as on minimum grades.
16To pass the GCSE all students are required to take the examination in first level (core) science
(Single Award). Students can also choose to pursue a Double Award (core and additional) or a
Triple Award (biology, chemistry and physics).
17Distance for the purpose of admission is the linear (crow flies) distance between the pupil’s
house and the school.
18Applications open the Fall before the student is due to start school. Families need to submit
their completed application (on-line or on paper) by the 15th of January for primary schools and
31th of October for secondary schools, including at least three and a maximum of five options.
Results of the application will be confirmed by the 16th of April for primary schools and by the
1st of March for secondary schools.
11
Chapter 1
included. Additional to performance tables, schools’ websites must include a link
to Ofsted’s website, an independent body producing detailed reports on perceived
schools’ quality on the basis of students’ and parents’ satisfaction.19
This study focuses on the unique policy change, which aimed at increasing school
choice among low income families through the provision of free transport to school.
Since 1996 a duty exists for Local Authorities to provide free transport to all
students aged 11-16 years old attending their nearest available school, provided
this is more than 3 miles (and less than 6 miles) walking distance from their
home.20 Free transport can take different forms: school buses (“yellow buses”),
free tickets for public transport, private cars and taxis or car mileage bonuses for
parents. The provision of free transport only covers the travels to and from schools
for the whole duration of the academic year and it is up to the LA to determine
case by case the most suitable transport arrangement.21 22 23
In academic year 2007/ 2008 the Free Transport policy extended the benefit for
low income students aged 11-16 to any of their three nearest schools over 2 (and
below 6) miles walking distance from their homes. In practice, this means that
starting from 2007/2008, FSME students with the first closest school below 2
miles but the second or third closest school between 2 and 6 miles can access free
transport to any of the more distant two schools. If the second or third nearest
school is over-subscribed and the pupil is not granted admission, the right to free
transport extends to the next available school. In order to be eligible for the
programme, parents need to be in receipt of benefits- the same criterion required
for free school meal status. Families can apply to their Local Authority at any
time during the academic year and need to provide initial evidence of their receipt
status. The Local Authority would then be in charge of verifying the existence
19All past reports can be consulted at www.ofsted.gov.uk.
20To the best of my knowledge, the vast majority of Local Authorities employ the Geographic
Information System (GIS) to compute the walking distance. Usually Local Authorities also
provide a free of charge service through which parents can compute the home to school distance
in a similar way.
21Local Authorities have the discretionary power to provide travel arrangements to ineligible
students, usually charging a fee, but priority is to be given to eligible children.
22The Education Act 1996 states “As a general guide, transport arrangements should not
require a child to make several changes on public transport resulting in an unreasonably long
journey time. Best practice suggests that the maximum each way length of journey for a child
of primary school age to be 45 minutes and for secondary school age 75 minutes”.
23Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there are not official data on what form of free
transport LAs provided to families.
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of the eligibility status on a yearly basis.24 The policy change did not affect non-
FSME students, with the exception that starting from 2007/2008 children living
between 2 and 3 miles from the nearest school became eligible for free transport
to that school.25
1.3 Data
To assess the effects of the Free Transport policy, I employ a differences-in-differences
identification strategy, comparing FSME students eligible for free transport (de-
fined on the basis of distance) with those ineligible before and after the policy.
The empirical analysis covers academic years 2004/2005-2010/2011 and only con-
siders students who do not reside in London. This decision follows from the fact
that first, since August 2005, all students living or attending a secondary school in
London have been entitled to free of charge transport or reduced fares on public
transports with no distance or income constraints. As such, London Local Author-
ities are not subject to the duties of the Free Transport policy. Second, London
secondary schools display different trends in terms of performance compared to the
rest of English schools. Table 1.1 shows how the eligible and ineligible groups are
constructed. The first two columns report the distance to the nearest and second
nearest school respectively, the third and fourth columns report the eligibility for
free transport before and after 2007/2008 and the last column reports the per-
centage of the total sample. For simplicity, and without great loss of generality,
I restrict the analysis to students who leave less than 2 miles from the nearest
school and assume that families can only choose between the 2 nearest schools.
The ineligible group is then defined as pupils who leave less than 2 miles from the
second nearest school, while the eligible group is formed by pupils whose second
nearest school is over 2 (and below 6) miles from home. As shown in the last
24Local Authorities are asked to publish detailed information on how the eligibility for free
transports would be assessed and what kind of assistance they would be providing.
25The fact that non-FSME students are now eligible for free transport to the nearest school
(between 2 and 3 miles) from home may potentially have an impact on FSME students as well,
through an increase in competition for schools between 2 and 3 miles. To rule this out, table
1.A1 in the Appendix reports results for a regression on non-FSME students of the form
yipt = γ0 + γ1Tpt + ηp + ηt + ωipt
where Tpt is equal to 1 if the nearest school is between 2 and 3 miles from home in the post
reform period, ηp are postcode fixed effects and ηt are year fixed effects. Estimates show that the
changes in the requirements for free transport for non-FSME students did not have a significant
impact on their choices.
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column of the table, overall these two groups count for 91% of the total number
of English students.
The core dataset used in the analysis is the Pupil Level Annual Census (PLASC),
carried out every year at the end of January. This is a Census of English state
school pupils, covering roughly 95% of the whole population.26 It includes infor-
mation on student demographics such as gender, ethnicity, language spoken at
home, special education need status (SEN), eligibility for free school meal, the
unique identifier of the school attended and pupils’ postcode of residence. There
are 900,609 postcodes in my data. A postcode includes roughly 20 households (a
block) located on the same side of a street and identifies on average less than 2
students per year in the data. I focus on students due to start secondary school
in academic years 2004/2005 to 2010/2011.27
A minor concern relates to the time at which the eligibility for free transport is
determined. As mentioned above, parents can apply for free transport at any time
during the academic year . Hence, one may worry that families may move (or avoid
to move) in order to gain eligibility for free transport to their preferred school. To
temper this concern, I consider students’ postcode measured during the last year
of primary school, that is, before the eligibility for the programme is assessed.
I use administrative data on schools, which report the exact address of every
establishment, to match each pupil to his two nearest secondary schools determined
on the basis of linear distance (“crow flies”, which determines admission) from the
student’s postcode of residence. I exclude from the sample of schools institutes
for SEN students (special schools). I do so because these schools may follow a
different curriculum from the national one and pupils studying below GCSE level
may take a different qualification altogether in one or more subjects.
To determine eligibility for free transport, I measure walking distance from the
pupil’s postcode to each school using the Geographic Information System (GIS),
which computes the shortest route available excluding motorways and major roads.
Figure 1.1 provides an example of how walking distances to school are computed:
the straight line reports the linear distance to the second nearest school, while the
blue-dotted line reports the shortest walking distance. In the example the student
would not be eligible for free transport if we were to consider the linear distance;
26About 5% of English students are enrolled in private schools.
27As I am interested in the transition between primary and secondary education, I exclude
from the analysis the small fraction of students (roughly 5%) enrolled in middle schools.
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however, he falls into the eligible group when considering walking distance to the
school.28
Finally, I use data on students’ test scores at KS4 (Year 11) from the National
Pupil Database (NPD) to obtain a measure of the quality of school attended.
The data include information on individual GCSE test scores in all subjects for
the academic years 2004/2005-2010/2011. One may worry that schools based
in different neighbourhoods may experience different trends in performance (for
instance because Local Authorities invest more resources in schools based in more
deprived areas). If this process differs between the eligible and ineligible group,
the estimates of the effect of the programme on the quality of the school attended
may be biased. In order to alleviate this concern, I define a time invariant measure
of school quality computed as the average of English and mathematics test scores
over the whole period of analysis and standardize it at the school level to have a
mean of zero and a unit standard deviation, such that the average school quality in
the period is zero. It is worth mentioning that this measure is constructed based
on the test scores of students who enrolled before the policy was implemented
(2007/2008) and is hence pre-determined.
Figure 1.A1 in the Appendix summarises the timing of the data building. In
October, at the beginning of the last year of primary school (Year 6), families fill
the application form to enrol at secondary school. In January of the following
year, at the time of the Census, I observe the residential address of the student
and measure the walking distance to each of the two nearest schools. In September
the student starts secondary school (Year 7) and, finally, in January I observe the
unique identifier for the school attended and assign the corresponding measure of
school quality to each student.
1.3.1 School characteristics
There are 3,323 secondary schools in England in the period of analysis.29 Panel
A of table 1.2 reports schools’ basic characteristics. Among them 50.23% are
28As school have some discretionary power in determining the walking route to the school,
there is still some risk of measurement error in determining the eligibility for the programme.
Specifically, schools consider the “safe” shortest route from the pupil’s house to the school,
implying that they are allowed to discard some routes when they do not find them appropriate
for the pupil. As the policy does not provide schools with objective criteria to define safety, I
am not able to control for this.
29This number does not account for secondary schools based in London and schools dedi-
cated to special education needs students (“special schools”), which have been excluded from the
analysis. Moreover, schools changing denomination are counted as separate schools.
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community schools, which are run and financed directly by the local government.30
On average each school enrols roughly 147 new students every year, going from a
minimum of 2 in the bottom decile of the distribution to almost 275 in the top
decile.
The last row of Panel A reports statistics on school quality. The top 10% of
schools perform 1.4 standard deviations better than the average and 2.4 standard
deviations above the bottom decile.
Panel B displays schools pupils’ composition. In the average establishment almost
80% of first year students are white British, more than 88% speak English as
a first language and roughly 20% of them are eligible for free school meals. As
for the number of new enrolments, students’ characteristics differ widely among
schools, suggesting that there is significant sorting of pupils based on ethnicity
and parental income. The fraction of white British students goes from 16% in
the bottom decile to a maximum of over 98% in the most “white” schools. Very
similar patterns emerge with respect to English speakers: in 10% of schools the
proportion of students speaking English as a first language is in the order of 36%,
while in the top 10% of the distribution it is virtually 100%.
Lastly, there is significant variation also with respect to students’ family income.
In the most wealthy schools, the percentage of FSME pupils is less than 2%. This
is well below the national average of 20%. On the other hand, FSME pupils
account for 57% of students in the most disadvantaged schools.
Overall, these figures show that there is large variation in both the quality and
students’ body composition of schools, including ethnic and income composition.
1.3.2 FSME students’ characteristics
There are 416,366 FSME students starting secondary school between academic
years 2004/2005 and 2010/2011. Panel A of table 1.3 reports the basic character-
istics of the sample. The first column reports statistics for the whole sample, the
second for students eligible for free transport (on the basis of distance) and the
last for ineligible students.
30There are several types of secondary schools in England, which differ regarding the degree of
freedom in setting their own curriculum. The most common are: community schools, controlled
by the local council; foundation schools, with slightly more freedom than community schools;
voluntary controlled and voluntary aided school, run by a foundation or a trust and academies,
comparable to US charter schools.
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Eligible students are more likely to be white British and to speak English as a
first language compared to the rest of the population: 87.5% of them report to be
of white British ethnicity and 95% are native English, compared to 74% and 84%
respectively among the ineligible.
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of students by distance to the two nearest school
from home. The majority of FSME students have at least two schools within 2
miles, with less than 10% of them having to travel more than 2 miles to reach the
closest school. However, more than 15% of FSME students have the second nearest
school above 2 miles from home, meaning that, starting from 2007/2008, they
would be eligible for free transport. Panel B of table 1.3 shows the statistics relative
to school availability and choice of school separately for eligible and ineligible
students. The average distance among all children to the nearest school is 0.9
miles while the distance to the second nearest is 1.8 miles, increasing to 1 and 2.9
miles respectively for the sample of eligible students.31
Most students attend either the nearest or the second nearest school from home:
more than 70% of eligible pupils attend one of these two schools, compared to
roughly 63% of other pupils. Interestingly, eligible students attend schools that
are, on average, of higher quality than the ineligible group (of the order of 0.11
standard deviations).
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the quality of the nearest and the second near-
est schools by distance to the second nearest school for FSME students (i.e. the
programme eligibility variable). Strikingly, on average, the second nearest school
is always of higher quality than the nearest one, the gap increasing with distance.
Even more interestingly, the quality of both schools decreases with distance as
long as pupils live within 2 miles from the school and it increases sharply above
the 2 miles threshold. The average standardized test scores of the nearest school
are in the order of -0.04 for both eligible and ineligible students, while the same
figures for the second nearest school are in the order of 0.14 for eligible students
and 0.07 for ineligible ones. This suggest two margins of residential segregation.
First, FSME students are generally segregated into neighbourhoods served by low
quality schools surrounded by affluent neighbourhoods with high quality schools.
Second, among FSME students, those who are more isolated are surrounded by
313 miles is the “statutory walking distance” for ineligible students and 2 miles the “statutory
distance” for low income students, i.e. the maximum distance students are expected to walk to
school according to the DfE.
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neighbourhoods served by higher quality schools than other disadvantaged stu-
dents (possibly wealthy residential areas).32 Overall, these figures suggest that,
by pushing students to enrol at more distant schools, the Free Transport policy
could in principle have beneficial effects on the quality of the school attended by
eligible students.
1.4 Theoretical framework
For the sake of simplicity, consider a world with only two schools. Note, however,
that the implications do not change if the model is extended to more than two
schools. A family decides whether to enrol their children at the nearest school (S1)
or at the more distant school (S2). The utility of enrolling at S1 and S2 is given,
respectively, by
U1 = Q1 − β1dist1 + e1
and
U2 = Q2 − β1dist2 + e2
where Q1 and Q2 are school quality measured as test scores, dist1 and dist2 are the
distance costs of attending the further away school and e1 and e2 are idiosyncratic
error terms. The parameter β1 captures the utility cost per mile of travelling to
school, embodying both the monetary cost of transport and the leisure loss. The
family will choose to enrol their children at the school delivering the highest utility.
Hence, the probability of attending S2 will be given by
P (S2 = 1) = P (U(S2) > U(S1)) = F (∆Q+ β1(dist1 − dist2))
Where F is the cumulative distribution of e2 − e1 and ∆Q = Q2 − Q1 . Note
that students may enrol at the more distant school even if this is of lower quality
32Figures 1.A2 and 1.A3 provide a visual representation of these two stylized facts for the city
of Manchester. Figure 1.A2 maps the difference in quality between the second nearest and the
nearest school (on the left) and the proportion of FSME students on the territory (on the right).
Figure 1.A3 shows the difference in quality between the second nearest and the nearest school
(on the left) and the proportion of FSME students living between 2 and 6 miles from the second
nearest school (on the right).
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compared to the nearest one (i.e. P (S2 = 1) 6= 0 even if ∆Q≤0). This captures
preference heterogeneity across families.33 In particular, as test scores are de facto
only a proxy of true quality, a family utility function may take into account other
characteristics, for instance peer composition, the quality of the neighbourhood or
more targeted programmes for disadvantaged pupils.
The Free Transport subsidy de facto reduces the cost dist2 of attending the distant
school. All else equal, the main implications of the programme on the choice of
school can be summarized as follows:
1) A positive impact on the probability of enrolling at S2;
2) A larger effect the higher the distance to S1;
3) A smaller effect the higher the distance to S2.
The second relevant question concerns the effects on the average quality of the
school attended. The expected quality can be written as
E(Q) = Q1P (S1 = 1) +Q2P (S2 = 1)
This is equivalent to
E(Q) = Q1 + ∆QF (∆Q+ β1(dist1 − dist2))
The effect is ambiguous and depends effectively on the distribution of school qual-
ity (∆Q) among those who took up the policy. In particular, given the design of
the programme, marginal students may be pushed to enrol at more distant schools
even if there is no gain in terms of quality. This follows from the fact that, as
mentioned, families have different preferences and take into account school char-
acteristics other than test scores. This implies that some families would prefer
to enrol their children at S2 even if ∆Q≤0, but are constrained by the distance
cost. The decline in dist2 may hence move these students away from S1 towards
S2. Second, the subsidy may imply that now for some families dist2 < dist1.
In, particular, the free transport subsidy provides monetary savings for students
whose nearest school is beyond walking distance and would have to pay public
33Though I do not report statistics here, the data at hand confirm that a non negligible fraction




transport out of their own pocket if attending the closest school. Hence, in the
post reform period these students may decide to enrol to the more distant school
even if ∆Q≤0, in order to save on transport costs.
The overall potential effect on E(Q) is shown in figure 1.4. The y-axis reports the
expected quality of the school attended E(Q) and the x-axis the difference in the
quality of the two schools ∆Q. The solid line plots the distribution of E(Q) for a
given P (S2 = 1) before the policy change: the larger ∆Q, the higher E(Q). The
effect of the policy E(Q) is shown by the dashed line. Free transport has the effect
of boosting the distribution of E(Q) for values of ∆Q greater than 0 and pushing
it down for values lower than zero.
Indeed, although ex-ante ∆Q > 0 (see table 1.3), meaning that FSME chil-
dren could potentially gain from the policy, I show that, due to school over-
subscription, students responding to the programme are disproportionally those
for whom ∆Q≤0, so that E(Q) declines as an effect of the policy.
1.5 Empirical strategy
In order to identify the effect of the policy on FSME students’ choice, I use
a differences-in-differences strategy based on the eligibility for free transport as
shown in table 1.1. In practice, I compare the choice of eligible students (i.e.
FSME pupils with the first school below 2 miles and the second nearest school
above 2 miles) and ineligible students (i.e. FSME students with both schools
below 2 miles) before (up to 2008) and after the implementation of the policy
(2007/2008 onwords).
Ignoring other covariates, I estimate the model in reduced form
yipt = β0 + β1Dpt + ηp + ηt + εipt (1.1)
where Dpt is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the second nearest school to
student i’s postcode is between 2 and 6 miles walking distance in the post reform
period, ηp is a postcode fixed effect, ηt are time fixed effects and the β1 parameter
captures the effect of the programme. The outcome variable yipt is either the
probability of attending a given school or the quality of the school attended.34
34Though the analysis relies on a linear probability model, results are consistent and compa-
rable when estimating a conditional logit model.
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Equation 1.1 leads consistent estimate of the intent to treat parameter under the
assumption that, in the absence of the programme, the changes in the outcome
variables would have been the same for eligible and ineligible postcodes. In other
words, the eligibility for the programme should be “as good as random”, implying
that Cov(Dpt, εipt|ηp, ηt) = 0.
One violation of this assumption may occur if distance to the second nearest school
(the treatment variable) is correlated with other unobservable characteristics of
the pupils. This might arise from endogenous mobility or, in general, from the
non random allocation of households across neighbourhoods. As the identification
strategy is a differences-in-differences (across postcodes over time), the real concern
is whether such selection is correlated with the policy reform, as in practice the
diff-in-diff is able to control for non random location as long as it is time invariant.
One might indeed think of circumstances where households respond strategically
to the policy. Consider, for instance, a household with very strong preferences for
a (good) far away school, say school A. In the pre policy period this household
would have moved near to the school in order to maximize the probability of
admission and minimize the cost of travel. If that school is centrally located
(better schools tend to be close to each other), then this household would have
been classified as ineligible in the pre policy period, as the second nearest school
would also have been within 2 miles from home. However, this household might
decide not to move in the post reform period in order to take advantage of the
subsidy. It would now be classified as eligible while still attending school A. Under
this set of circumstances one would find that households further away from the
second nearest school are more likely to attend school A in the programme vs the
pre programme period, but this would be a pure compositional effect, rather than
a genuine effect of the policy. There are three arguments that suggest that this
selection should not be a major source of concern. First, as discussed in section
1.3, all distances to schools are predetermined and, as such, do not depend on
residential choices in response to the policy. Second, low income households are
typically immobile, especially considering that house prices are highly correlated
with proximity to good schools. Third, this can be empirically tested. Though,
for simplicity, I do not report this here, a regression of the number of household
by postcode on the treatment variable shows no significant correlation between
the policy change and students’ residential choices, suggesting that endogenous
mobility is not a major source of concern.
Aside from endogenous mobility in response to the policy, another potential source
of bias in the estimates might result from latent time trends in school attendance
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among children in populated vs isolated areas. If those living in more populated
areas are increasingly more likely to attend closer and possibly better schools
compared to those in isolated areas, this might confound the effect of the policy.
In theory this seems to be unlikely. Also, if this were the case one could expect
a smooth trend across treatment and control areas over time. Figures 1.5 and 1.6
report the treatment effect at different leads and lags from the implementation of
the policy.35 Overall, there is no evidence of the presence of pre policy trends in
the outcome variables. Moreover, there is a change in the gradient precisely at the
time of the policy change, reassuring on the validity of the identification strategy.
1.6 Results
This section begins by showing the overall effect of the program on the choice of
school (subsection 1.6.1). Second, it looks at the effects on the quality of the school
attended (subsection 1.6.2). Third, it checks the identifying assumptions and
whether the main findings are robust to the alternative specifications (subsections
1.6.3 and 1.6.4). Finally, it analyses heterogeneous effects in the impact of the
programme (subsections 1.6.5 and 1.6.6).
1.6.1 The effect of the policy on the choice of school
Figure 1.7 shows the probability of attending the nearest school before and after
2008 by distance to the second nearest school. Data only refer to FSME students.
Observations on the left of the vertical line (i.e. with distance to the second nearest
school less than 2 miles) identify the ineligible group, those on the right (i.e. with
distance to the second nearest school greater than 2 miles) the eligible group. The
dashed line reports data for the pre policy period, while the solid line reports
data for the policy period. The difference between the outcome of the eligible and
ineligible groups before and after the policy identifies the effect of the programme.
As it is clear, the proportion of eligible students attending the nearest school falls
significantly after the implementation of the policy, while it is virtually unchanged
35 The figures plot the coefficients ψ1t from the following regression (where ηs=1 if t = s):
yipt = ψ0 +
2010/2011∑
s=2005/2006
ψ1s(Dp ∗ ηs) + ηp + ηt + uipt
whereDp is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the second nearest school to student i’s postcode
is between 2 and 6 miles walking distance.
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for the ineligible group. This suggests that free transport had the effect of decrease
the fraction of low income students attending the closest school.
Table 1.4 shows the corresponding estimates of the effect of the programme on
the probability of attending each of the two nearest schools (row 1 and row 2) or
any other school (row 3). The first column controls only for Local Authority fixed
effects, time fixed effects and students’ background characteristics. These include:
gender, student’s first language and a dummy for whether the student identifies
himself as “white British”. Standard errors are clustered at the Local Authority
level. Results show a clear negative, though small, effect of the programme on
the probability of attending the nearest school from home, with a coefficient of
-0.027 (significant at the 1% level). These results imply that being eligible for the
programme decreases the probability of attending the nearest school by 2.7 p.p.
in the post reform period, corresponding to a 5.6% decrease over the mean of 48%.
The decrease in the probability of attending the nearest school is counterbalanced
by a 1.2 p.p. increase in the probability of attending the second nearest school and
a 1.6 p.p. increase in the probability of attending other schools.36 These represent,
respectively, an increase of 6.8% and 4.6% over the corresponding means of 17.6%
and 34.6%.
The specification in columns 2 and 3 further controls for potential time varying
endogenous sorting within Local Authority. Specifically, families can endogenously
choose their location with respect to schools on the basis of unobserved charac-
teristics which affect both the probability of being eligible for free transport and
the choice of the school. If this process is not time invariant, estimates would be
biased. In an attempt to control for this, I include in the regression a polynomial
of the second order for the distance to the second nearest school (column 2) and
to the nearest school (column 3). The coefficients are slightly smaller than the
ones presented in column 1 but still statistically significant.
Finally, the specification in column 4 controls for postcode fixed effects. This
regression compares eligible and ineligible students in the pre and post reform
periods absorbing all time invariant unobservable characteristics of the student’s
postcode of residence. Though the specification is highly demanding, the esti-
mates on the probability of attending the nearest and the second nearest school
remain significant and similar in magnitude, implying a 1.8 p.p. decrease in the
attendance of the nearest school and a 1 p.p. increase in the attendance of the sec-
ond nearest school, corresponding to a 3.8% decrease and a 5.7% increase over the
36Note that, by construction, the three rows add up to zero.
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mean, respectively. Interestingly, the coefficient on the probability of attending
other schools remains positive, but is not significant at standard confidence levels,
confirming the intuition that the choice of school among disadvantaged students
is largely between the nearest and the second nearest schools.
1.6.2 The effect of the programme on the quality of the
school attended
The crucial question of the paper is whether the shift in school choice had any
effect on the average quality of the school attended by eligible students.
Table 1.5 shows the estimates of equation 1.1 where the dependent variable is the
quality of the school attended, using the same specifications as in table 1.4.37As
mentioned, quality is standardize over the whole period to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one.38 It is worth reminding that this measure is
constructed based on GCSE test scores of students who were not affected by the
policy (as they enrolled before 2007/2008) and is hence pre-determined.
Estimates show that eligible students choose lower quality schools with respect to
the pre-policy period than ineligible ones. On average, the quality of the school
attended is between 0.021 and 0.022 standard deviations below the pre-policy pe-
riod. Families whose children are eligible for FSM typically follow in the bottom
20% of the income distribution, implying that a household composed of two work-
ing parents will have post taxes earnings of roughly £16,000 (at year 2008)39 .
Estimates shown in table 1.5 suggest that, on average, families are willing to trade
2.2% of a standard deviation of quality in exchange for the subsidy. As the average
transport cost to school for a child aged 11-16 is between £330 and £440 per aca-
demic year, the subsidy corresponds to approximately 2-3% of the family annual
income.40 This implies that a household would be willing to enrol their children
at a school nearly 70% of a standard deviations worse if the subsidy was 100% of
37This measure is based on the average quality for the school’s existence period. Since the panel
is unbalanced due to school openings and closures, different spans of time may be considered for
schools with different existence periods.
38Results do not change if quality is defined as the average test scores at baseline year, i.e. at
2004/2005.
39Statistics from the HM Revenue and Customs, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/percentile-points-from-1-to-99-for-total-income-before-
and-after-tax.
40The average cost of a monthly ticket is between £30 and £40 and the academic year goes
from September to the end of July.
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their initial annual income (corresponding to approximately £32,000, enough to
move from the bottom 20% to the median of the income distribution).
Overall, these results suggest that the policy did not have the desired effect of
improving the quality of the school attended among FSME students. First, as
discussed in section 1.4, as a result of the programme some FSME students may
decide to enrol to more distant schools, even when there is no gain in measured
quality. Second, as families’ access to high quality schools is rationed, eligible
students are de facto able to attend distant schools only as long as they are not very
popular (and presumably high quality). The two effects combined may explain why
the policy did not improve the average quality of the school attended.
So far I have assumed that the only measure of school quality considered by parents
is given by students’ standardized test scores. Nonetheless, as discussed in section
1.4 other characteristics may also be relevant in the choice of school. Rows 2 to 4
of table 1.5 report the estimates of equation 1.1 for schools’ student composition,
measured as the percentage of white British students, the percentage of FSME
and the percentage of native English speakers. Similarly to school’s quality, all
the three variables are constructed as a mean for the whole period of Year 11
students’ characteristics and hence are pre-determined. Row 2 and row 4 report
the estimates of the percentage of white British students and English speakers
in the school. Overall, all estimates are very close to zero and not statistically
significant. Interestingly, a significant and positive, though rather small, effect
emerges with respect to the percentage of students eligible for free school meals in
the school (row 3): students eligible for free transport enrol at schools with between
0.4 and 0.6 percentage point higher fraction of pupils with a similar background.
1.6.3 Robustness checks
As stated in section 1.5, the identification strategy relies on the assumption that
the assignment to the eligible and ineligible group is as good as random. I attempt
to prove the validity of this assumption showing the presence of pre policy parallel
trends and probing the robustness of the estimates to the inclusion of (observable)
students’ characteristics. Nonetheless, one may still be concerned about the pres-
ence of latent trends. One way to deal with this is to make the treatment and
control groups the more closely comparable as possible. I do so by restricting the
sample to families who live closer to the 2 miles threshold. Specifically, I redefine
the eligible group as students with the first nearest school between 1 and 2 miles
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from home and the second nearest school between 2 and 3 miles from home. Sim-
ilarly, the control group is defined as pupils with both the first and the second
nearest school between 1 and 2 miles from home.
The first panel of table 1.6 reports the corresponding estimates of equation 1.1
Results are very close in magnitude, however, they are not statistically significant.
This should not be surprising, as the sample is reduced by two thirds and, once
including postcode fixed effects, there is little variation left.
There are two concerns remaining. First, a (small) number of school opening and
closures which might be correlated with the treatment variable.41. Second, school
conversions, which are de facto treated as two separate schools (i.e. when school
A converts to school B I treat these as two separate schools). As in the case
of school openings and closures, this may generate bias if it is correlated with
the treatment variable. In an attempt to rule this out, the second panel of table
1.6 shows estimates for the sub-sample including only postcodes which are not
subject to school openings/closures or school conversions, i.e. for which the school
identifier of the two nearest schools is the same for the whole period of analysis.
Reassuringly, estimates are robust and very close to the ones presented above,
suggesting that these concerns are of second order.
1.6.4 Falsification tests
As an additional way of checking the validity of the identification strategy, in the
remainder of this section I present a number of falsification tests.
The top panel of table 1.7 reports regressions of the probability of attending the
nearest, the second nearest or any other school and of the quality of the school
attended for the city of London. As mentioned, London is not subject to the duties
imposed by the Free Transport policy, as all students are provided with discounted
fares on any public transport since 2005. Hence, if the identification strategy is
valid, one should not observe any change in the choice of school following the
implementation of the programme. Columns 1 to 3 show estimates for the choice
of the school attended. Reassuringly, I find no evidence of an effect of the Free
Transport programme on the choice of school among students living in London:
estimates are virtually zero and not significant across all specifications. Columns
41The case of new school openings should not be an issue as I restrict the sample to years
previous to academic year 2011/2012, i.e. before the mass academy conversion took place.
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4 reports estimates on the quality of the school attended as defined in table 1.5.
Again, estimates are not significant at the standard levels.
The second panel of table 1.7 reports estimates for non-FSME students. As higher
income students are not entitled to free transport, there should be no effect of
the programme on their choice of school. All estimates are close to zero and
non significant at the standard levels, with the exception of the one on school
quality. Note, however, that the coefficient is substantially smaller than the one
found for FSME students and statistical significance may simply follow from the
considerably larger number of observations.
Overall, these falsification tests lend reassuring support to the findings the previous
sections.
1.6.5 Non-linear effects
As in figure 1.7, figure 1.8 reports the attendance of the nearest school before and
after the reform separately for students for whom the first school is close and far
away. The left graph focuses on pupils whose nearest school is located between
1 and 2 miles from home, the right graph on students whose first nearest school
is within 1 mile. According to the predictions of the theoretical model, the effect
of the programme should be larger the higher the distance to the nearest school
and the lower the distance to the more distant school. Consistently, the effect of
the policy is significant only for the sub-sample of students whose nearest school
is above 1 mile from home. Moreover, results seem to be driven by pupils whose
second nearest school is located closer to the 2 miles threshold.
Table 1.8 reports the corresponding estimates of equation 1.1. The top panel
shows the results of two separate regressions by distance to the nearest school (i.e
below 1 mile or between 1 and 2 miles). Column 1 reports the estimates for the
probability of attending the nearest school. Estimates are very close to zero and
not significant for students living below 1 mile from the nearest school, but in the
order of 2.5 p.p. and significant for those living more than 1 mile from the nearest
school. The second column reports the coefficients for the probability of attending
the second nearest school: estimates are small and not significant for students
living closer than 1 mile to the nearest school, while a positive and significant




The second panel shows the estimates on two separate regressions by distance to
the second nearest school. Specifically, I divide the eligible group in 1) students
whose distance to the second nearest school is above 2 but below 3 miles; 2)
students whose distance to the second nearest school is above 3 miles. Results are
significant only for students whose second nearest school is located closer to the
2 miles threshold, i.e. between 2 and 3 miles from home, while no effect emerges
for students with the second nearest school above 3 miles.
1.6.6 Heterogeneous effects
The first six columns of table 1.9 report estimates of the probability of attending
each of the nearest schools by quality of the two available schools, by region of
residence and LAs Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI).42 43
Columns 1 and 2 investigate heterogeneities based on the region of residence. I
define “urban” and “rural” areas according to the 2011 UK Census classification.
Rural areas are more likely to be characterized by a lower coverage of public
transport, meaning that, compared to urban areas, the time cost of travelling to
school would be generally higher. Most Local Authorities conformed to the Free
Transport policy introducing a school bus service collecting pupils directly from
their homes. This substantially reduces not only the monetary cost of travelling
to school by public transport, but also the time cost, especially for families living
in less populated areas. Unsurprisingly, the larger effect of the policy is found in
less dense regions: pupils living in rural areas are 2.2 p.p. less likely to attend
their nearest school and 1.9 p.p. more likely to enrol at the second nearest, while
virtually no effect is found for students living in urban areas.
Columns 3 and 4 report results for two separate regressions for Local Authorities
with a IDACI score below (less deprived) or above the median (more deprived).
Though coefficients are negative for both sub-samples, the effect is significant only
for students living in more deprived areas and in the order of 2.6 p.p. Estimates of
the probability of attending the second nearest school are also larger and significant
42The Index measures locally the proportion of children living in low income households.
43Figure 1.A4 in the Appendix provides graphical evidence of the heterogeneity of results
across different sub-groups of the population. All sub-figures report the probability of attending
the nearest school from home as a function of the distance to the second nearest school (i.e.
the eligibility variable) before and after the reform. Sub-figures a) and b) show the the effect
separately for a) students whose second nearest school is of higher quality compared to the
nearest one and b) students whose second nearest school is of lower quality compared to the
nearest. Sub-figures c) and d) show the same exercise for the sub-samples of urban and rural
areas and sub-figures e) and f) for less and more deprived areas.
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only for IDACI scores above the median. Overall, this suggests that the programme
has a larger effect in those areas where children are more likely to have a deprived
background. This is consistent with the intuition that only constrained families
respond to the monetary incentives of the subsidy, while wealthier ones will be
more likely to enrol their children at the best school regardless of free transport.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of table 1.9 show the estimates for the sub-sample of
students whose second nearest school is of higher quality than the nearest and
the sub-sample of students whose second nearest school is of lower quality than
the nearest. Interestingly, the coefficient on pupils whose second nearest school
is of lower quality is considerably larger and statistically significant at standard
levels. Similarly, the probability of attending the second nearest school increases
significantly only for those students whose second nearest school is of lower quality.
These findings support the argument that over-subscription of good schools may de
facto prevent families to enrol their children at more popular institutions.44 This
mechanism is further enhanced by distance-based admission criteria, implying that
more isolated students (i.e. those eligible for free transport) will have lower chances
to be accepted.
To prove this point, I use data on school capacity in year 2005/2006 to construct a
proxy for schools’ over-subscription. Note that the decision to use school capacity
at baseline follows from the fact that changes in school choice induced by the
programme may have an independent impact on schools over-subscription. I define
a school as “over-subscribed” if the total count of students enrolled in the school
in equal or exceeds the number of places available (i.e. school capacity).45
Columns 7 and 8 of table 1.9 show separate estimates for the sample of students
who have the second nearest school not oversubscribed and over-subscribed, re-
spectively. As predicted, results are larger and significant only for students whose
further away school is not full or over capacity. Specifically, students who are
eligible for free transport are 2.7 p.p. less likely to attend the nearest school after
2008 and 1.8 p.p. more likely t o attend the second nearest. In contrast, estimates
are virtually zero and not significant at the standard levels for students whose
second nearest school is oversubscribed.
44 Though I do not provide evidence here, over-subscription is strongly correlated with school
test scores. Estimates are available on request.
45In academic year 2005/2006, 36% of English secondary schools were oversubscribed.
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1.7 Summary and conclusions
This chapter investigates how the provision of free transport to attend schools
further away affects the school choices of low income families. I explore a unique
policy change that occurred in England in academic year 2007/2008, which ex-
panded the right to free transport for low SES students to any of the three nearest
school to home, subject to distance thresholds. While a simple theoretical model
shows that monetary incentives should push families to enrol their children in more
distant schools, the effect on school quality is ambiguous, as constrained parents
may be induced to choose schools further away even without a gain in terms of
quality. Moreover, over-subscription of high quality schools may de facto limit
parents’ choice to less popular schools.
Using confidential administrative data for the period 2004/2005-2010/2011 on the
universe of English students, I identify the effect of the programme through a
differences-in-differences approach, comparing low SES students living in eligible
postcodes in the pre and post reform period with those who are ineligible. As
the Free Transport policy is based on walking distances, I compute the shortest
available route for each pupil using the Geographic Information System (GIS).
Results show that, consistently, students eligible for free transport enrol at more
distant schools; the effect being larger the more distant the nearest school and the
more deprived the region of residence. However, the programme does not seem to
lead to the intended outcome of improving the quality of the school attended by
low SES students: the effect on the quality of the school attended is negative and
robust to alternative specifications.
Though the direct objective of the Free Transport policy was to improve the quality
of the school attended by low income families, it may still be possible that the
programme succeeded under different dimensions. Specifically, though I do not
address this question here, low income pupils may gain from higher choice, despite
attending lower quality schools. Students may take advantage of the subsidy
to escape the poor environment where they are living, benefiting from having
peers with less disadvantaged backgrounds. The policy may hence result in higher





Figure 1.1: Linear and walking distance to the second
nearest school
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data. The map reports the
linear (black line) and walking distance (blue and grey lines) between
the pupil house and the second nearest school from home.
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Figure 1.2: FSME students’ distribution by
distance to the first and second nearest schools
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period
2004/2005-2010/2011.
Figure 1.3: Average school quality by distance to
the second nearest school- FSME students
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period
2004/2005-2010/2011. Local mean smoothing.
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Notes: The figure plots the expected quality of the school attended
on the y-axis and the difference in the quality of the two nearest
school on the x-axis. The solid line represents the distribution of
school quality before the policy change, the dashed line after the
policy change. See also text for details.
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Figure 1.5: Treatment effect at different leads and lags from the

































2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011
Notes: The solid line displays the coefficients of a regression of a
dummy for attending the nearest school on the interaction between
the year dummies and the eligibility dummy. 90% confidence inter-
vals. Omitted category: year 2004/2005.
Figure 1.6: Treatment effect at different leads and lags from the




































2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011
Notes: The solid line displays the coefficients of a regression of the
quality of the secondary school attended on the interaction between
the year dummies and the eligibility dummy. 90% confidence inter-
vals. Omitted category: year 2004/2005.
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Figure 1.7: Probability of attending the nearest school by
distance to the second nearest school
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period 2004/2005-
2010/2011. Local mean smoothing with 95% confidence interval. The dashed
lines refer to the pre policy period, the solid lines to the post policy period.
Figure 1.8: Probability of attending the nearest school by distance
to the second nearest school: non-linear effects
(a) Distance nearest school>1 (b) Distance nearest school<1
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period 2004/2005-2010/2011.
Local mean smoothing with 95% confidence interval. The dashed lines refer to the
pre policy period, the solid lines to the post policy period.
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Table 1.1: Free transport to school
dist1 dist2 PRE 2007/2008 POST 2007/2008 SAMPLE %
INELIGIBLE < 2 < 2 NO NO 73.31
ELIGIBLE < 2 > 2 NO YES (School2) 17.60
Table 1.2: School characteristics
All schools Bottom decile Top decile
Panel A: Schools
Number of schools 3,323
Community schools (%) 50.23
Academies (%) 7.52
Foundation schools (%) 23.14
Voluntary schools (%) 2.29
Other schools (%) 16.28
Number of new enrolments 147.19 2.07 274.86
Average exit cohorts’ test scores 0.21 -0.78 1.60
Panel B: Students’ composition
White British (%) 79.24 15.58 98.23
FSME (%) 19.29 1.33 56.63
Females (%) 48.72 10.59 90.45
English speakers (%) 88.49 36.00 99.86
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data. The table reports summary statistics for the
period 2004/2005-2010/2011. School quality is defined as the average of test scores of Year 11
students over the whole period. It has been standardized at the school level such that school
quality in the period has an average of zero and a unit standard deviation.
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Table 1.3: FSMS students’ characteristics
All Eligible Ineligible
Panel A: Demographics
White British (%) 76.34 87.42 73.68
Pakistani (%) 6.91 2.06 8.07
Indian (%) 1.4 0.44 1.63
Bangladeshi (%) 1.78 0.53 2.07
Black African (%) 2.16 0.94 2.45
Other ethnic group (%) 11.42 8.61 12.09
Females (%) 49.46 49.00 49.57
English speakers (%) 85.76 94.79 83.59
Panel B: Available schools
Distance to nearest school (miles) 0.88 1.08 0.83
Distance to second nearest school (miles) 1.77 2.86 1.51
Attending nearest school (%) 47.83 65.84 43.50
Attending second nearest school (%) 17.60 8.16 19.87
Quality of school attended -0.06 0.03 -0.08
Quality of nearest school -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Quality of second nearest school 0.08 0.14 0.07
N 416,366 80,589 335,777
Notes: See table 1.2. Eligible students are defined as FSME students having the second nearest
school between 2 and 6 miles from home.
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Table 1.4: The effect of the Free Transport policy on school choice
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Attend:
1. School 1 -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
2. School 2 0.012** 0.009* 0.009* 0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
3. Other schools 0.016* 0.015* 0.014* 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Time Fixed Effects X X X X
LA Fixed Effects X X X X
Additional controls X X X X
dist2 X X X
dist1 X X
Postcode Fixed Effects X
N 416,365 416,365 416,365 416,365
Notes: OLS estimates of equation 1.1. See text for details. Clustered (at the
Local Authority level) standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 1.5: The effect of the Free Transport policy on the quality of the
school attended
[1] [2] [3] [4] N
School characteristics:
1. Test scores -0.022** -0.021* -0.021** -0.022** 413,691
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
2. % White British -0.224 -0.182 -0.185 -0.130 413,744
(0.308) (0.298) (0.296) (0.270)
3. % FSME 0.643*** 0.698*** 0.610*** 0.369** 413,744
(0.153) (0.150) (0.150) (0.127)
4. % English -0.337 -0.299 -0.301 -0.118 413,744
(0.242) (0.233) (0.231) (0.210)
Time Fixed Effects X X X X
LA Fixed Effects X X X X
Additional controls X X X X
dist2 X X X
dist1 X X
Postcode Fixed Effects X



























































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Falsification tests
Attend: School quality:
School1 School2 Other schools Test scores
[1] [2] [3] [4]
London:
-0.007 0.005 0.002 -0.037
(0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
N 131,979 131,979 131,979 131,979
Non-FSME sample:
-0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.010**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
N 2,092,691 2,092,691 2,092,691 2,065,935
Notes: See table 1.4. The first panel focuses on the restricted sample of students residing in
London. The second panel focuses on the sample of non-FSME students. See text for details.
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Table 1.8: Non-linear effects
Attend:
School1 School2 Other schools
[1] [2] [3] N
By dist1:
dist1 < 1 -0.007 0.006 0.002 266,428
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010)
dist1 > 1 -0.025** 0.015* 0.010 149,937
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
By dist2:
2 < dist2 < 3 -0.019** 0.011* 0.008 393,379
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
3 < dist2 < 6 -0.013 0.005 0.008 358,763
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Notes: see table 1.4. The first panel shows estimates of equation 1.1 for
a) the sample of students living within 1 mile from the nearest school
and b) the sample of students living more than 1 mile from the nearest
school. The second panel shows estimates of equation 1.1 focusing on
a) eligible students living within 3 miles from the second nearest school
and b) eligible students living more than 3 mile from the second nearest
































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A: Supplementary tables and figures
Figure 1.A1: Timeline of data building
Notes: The figure shows the time-line of data building. In January of the last year of primary
school (Year 6) the Pupil Census reports the address of students and each pupil is matched
to his three nearest secondary schools (and corresponding distances). One year after, the
Census reports the information relative to the secondary school attended and the variable
“quality of school attended” is determined.
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Figure 1.A2: School quality and FSME students distribution by neighbour-
hood. City of Manchester
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period 2004/2005-2010/2011.
The map on the left shows the difference in the quality of the second nearest and the
nearest school (∆Q) by LLSOA (Lower Layer Super Output Area). The maps on the
right shows the proportion of FSME students by LLSOA. The dark areas represent
regions with a level above the median, the lighter below.
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Figure 1.A3: School quality and eligible students distribution by neighbour-
hood (FSME only). City of Manchester
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period 2004/2005-2010/2011.
The map on the left shows the difference in the quality of the second nearest and the
nearest school (∆Q) by LLSOA (Lower Layer Super Output Area). The maps on the
right shows the proportion of FSME students by LLSOA. The dark areas represent
regions with a level above the median, the lighter below.
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Figure 1.A4: Heterogeneous effects: probability of attending the nearest school
by distance to the second nearest school
(a) Qual2>Qual1 (b) Qual2<Qual1
(c) Urban areas (d) Rural areas
(e) Less deprieved (f) More deprieved
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data for the period 2004/2005-2010/2011.
Local mean smoothing with 95% confidence interval. The dashed lines refer to the
pre policy period, the solid lines to the post policy period.
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Table 1.A1: Estimates for the sample of non-FSME students
Attend: School quality:
School1 School2 Other schools Test scores
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2<dist1 < 3 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.008
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
N 2,547,817 2,547,817 2,547,817 2,512,175
Notes: OLS estimates of the following equation: yipt = γ0 +γ1Tpt +ηp +ηt +ωipt,
where Tpt is equal to 1 if the nearest school is between 2 and 3 miles form home
in the post reform period and ηp are postcode fixed effects. See text for details.
Table 1.A2: Estimates for the sample including students with the nearest
school above 2 miles from home
Attend: School quality:
School1 School2 Other schools Test scores
[1] [2] [3] [4]
-0.013 0.010* 0.003 -0.022**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
N 458,008 458,008 458,008 454,570






In recent years there has been great emphasis on how school choice can act as a
costless tool to promote school quality. The idea has been particularly pushed in
the UK, where there is increasing attention on families’ right to choose the pre-
ferred school (Le Grand, 1991, 1993, 2003; Machin and Vignoles, 2006). Advocates
of this model claim that it helps improving market efficiency through two channels.
First, it boosts students’ outcomes trough a better matching of pupils to schools.
Second, it generates competition among institutions to attract students, implying
that schools failing to meet parental preferences on teaching quality, among other
things, may face the risk of closing. Clearly, this happens if funding is closely
related to enrolment, i.e. if schools have a financial incentive to attract additional
students.
On the other hand, opponents to greater choice argue that it results in higher
students’ turnover, with potentially detrimental effects on teachers’ performance
(Hanushek et al., 2004). Moreover, choice could come at the cost of increased
school segregation, with the result that the gains may be disproportionally con-
centrated in wealthier schools. They hence argue that “leveling the playing field”
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by appropriate resource based policies may be a more promising tool to promote
quality.1
Empirical evidence on the effects of school choice and competition is, however,
not unanimous. In her pioneering study, Hoxby (2000) uses natural boundaries in
metropolitan areas as instruments for school choice, showing that greater choice
translates into higher school productivity and less private schooling.2 Promising
findings come also from studies exploring the effect of charter school penetration
in the US on public school students’ outcomes (Bifulco and Ladd, 2006; Carnoy
et al., 2006; Booke et al., 2008). The evidence is less conclusive, however, in stud-
ies exploring the competition effect generated by openings of private and religious
1There is little evidence, however, of resources being effective in improving school outcome.
Early evidence comes from the so-called “Coleman Report” (Coleman, 1966), arguing that the
effect of additional resources on student achievement is small compared to the impact of fam-
ily background. Over the years, however, many studies have criticized the Coleman’s Report,
arguing that its findings could not be interpreted as causal (see, among the others, Bowles and
Levin, 1968, Kain and Hanushek, 1972, Hanushek, 1979 Sorenson and Morgan, 2000). Since
then, several studies have confirmed the modest role of school resources in determining student
achievement (Barr and Dreeben, 1983 and Hanushek, 1996). Nonetheless, evidence is mixed and
other studies find a significant positive effect on pupils’ performance. For instance, Murnane
(1975) reports that a broad range of school resources are positively associated with student out-
comes, suggesting that relatively small increases in spending may lead to significant gains in test
scores. Similarly, Greenwald et al. (1996) find that an increase in school spending is associated
with higher students’ achievements. With respect to the UK, evidence mostly focuses on primary
schools and generally suggests the presence of a positive relationship between resources and stu-
dent outcomes, though the magnitude of the effect varies significantly across studies (Holmlund
et al., 2010; Machin and McNally, 2011). Similar evidence comes from studies making use of
natural experiments. Among the others, Machin et al. (2007) explore the effect of higher school
spending in City Technology Colleges, finding a positive impact on students’ English and science
test scores, but not in mathematics. More recently, Machin et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of
resources on students’ outcome in the context of a policy initiative targeting inner-city secondary
schools. Results show a positive impact on school attendance and performance in mathematics.
For a complete summary of past literature see Machin and McNally (2011). The literature is
more unanimous on the effects of a more targeted increase in school resources, such as raising
the teacher-pupil ratio and promoting teachers’ quality. In his pioneering study, Krueger (1999)
explores the effects of a randomized experiment assigning students to reduced size classes in
grades 1 through 3 (the project is widely known as the Tennessee STAR Project). He finds that
attending smaller classes improved student performance in the standardized tests and that this
gain grew in the subsequent years. More recently, Chetty et al. (2011) investigate the effects of
the same programme on long term outcomes, finding that students assigned to small classes are
more likely to attend college and exhibit significant improvement on other long-term outcomes.
Positive effects on both test scores and future earnings are found also with respect to English
schools (Dearden et al., 2002b; Iacovou, 2002) (for additional evidence on the impact of class
size on student achievement refer to Finn et al. (2005), Muennig et al. (2011) and Angrist et al.
(2015)). Finally, direct evidence on the beneficial impact of good teachers comes from Gordon
et al. (2006) showing that the average student assigned to a teacher who was in the bottom
quartile of the grade distribution during his or her first two years loses on average 5 percentile
points relative to other students. In contrast, the average student assigned to a top-quartile
teacher gaines 5 percentile points. Lastly, Chetty et al. (2014), who shows how students assigned
to better instructors are more likely to attend college, earn higher salaries, and are less likely to
have children as teenagers.
2In a comment to this paper, however, Rothstein (2007) challenges Hoxby’s results.
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schools, finding from significant beneficial (Hoxby, 1994; Couch et al., 2003; Card
et al., 2010) to zero effects (Arum, 1996; Jepsen, 2003). A different strand of
the literature explores the effect of school vouchers to attend private schools on
public school performance. Direct evidence on voucher-based competition comes
from a study of Chilean schools by Hsieh and Urquiola (2006). Using comparisons
across municipalities, they find no significant relationship between private school
enrolment and average district gains in school performance. Consistent with theo-
retical analyses by Epple and Romano (1998) and Nechyba (2000), however, they
show that the introduction of vouchers led to an increase in the stratification of
socio-economic status (SES) groups across schools. With respect to the UK, most
of the literature focuses on the indirect effects on competition induced by the com-
pulsory publication of school performance tables. These studies emphasize how
competitive pressure resulting from increased accountability improves school per-
formance in terms of students’ achievement (Levacic, 2004; Burgess et al., 2010).
A second approach evaluates the effects of secondary school admission reforms,
like the introduction of free parental choice, finding a positive but modest impact
on school performance (Bradley et al., 2000, 2001). Finally, Gibbons et al. (2008)
show that higher competition among schools does not have beneficial effects in
terms of school outcomes, except potentially for a small positive effect among
faith schools.3
This paper aims at shading additional light on the potential impact of a choice
model on school performance. In particular, it explores the effect of the Free
Transport policy discussed in chapter 1, which de facto increased school choice
among FSME students, on schools and schools behaviour.
The chapter proceeds by first exploring the effect of the increase in school choice
on enrolment. Consistent with the results showed in chapter 1, I find that enrol-
ment declines more in schools affected by the policy. I then investigate whether
incentives are powerful enough for competition to have potential beneficial ef-
fects on school performance. Specifically, for this to be the case, school resources
should be closely linked to enrolment, or, in other words, “money should follow
the pupil”. Despite this being the principle regulating school funding in the UK,
both anecdotal and statistical evidence suggest that the mechanism is far from
3 Figure 2.A2 in the Appendix provides descriptive evidence of the relationship between school
choice and school quality in England. It shows the average school choice index by LA on the left
and the average school quality by LA on the right.
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perfect. Nonetheless, I find evidence that the decrease in enrolment in most af-
fected schools leads to a almost proportional change in available funds, providing
supporting evidence that resources do follow pupils.
In the second part of the paper I focus more directly on the effect of the Free
Transport policy on school performance, measured as the GCSE test scores of
students in Year 11. Results show a positive and significant effect on school quality;
however, estimates are economically modest.
This chapter unfolds as follows: in sections 2.2 and 2.3 I briefly discuss the institu-
tional background and present basic descriptive evidence. Sections 2.4 introduces
the empirical strategy. Sections 2.5 shows results of the effect of the policy on en-
rolment, resources and school quality. Section 2.7 explores heterogeneous effects
across schools. The last section summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Background
The analysis carried out in this chapter strongly relies on the institutional back-
ground introduced in chapter 1 (refer to section 1.2). In what follows I will hence
focus only on how resources are allocated to schools, a crucial determinant of
whether higher competitive pressure may have an effect on school performance.
2.2.1 School funding and teachers’ pay
The process of school funding involves four main stages. Initially, the central Gov-
ernment sets the total amount of revenues to be allocated to education spending
in England. This budget is set in the context of the spending review cycle, which
usually takes place every 2 or 3 years. The Government then divides the total
amount allocated into the proportion to be spent for schools (roughly 70 % of the
total) and to be spent on other education sectors, such as universities and further
education.
At the next stage, the Department of Education and Skills passes the funds for
schools to the Local Authorities. This is divided into different grants, each allo-
cated according to different criteria and subject to different constraints on how
the money can be spent. Local Authorities then retain the share of the school
52
Chapter 2
budget devoted to “central services” which are provided directly to students, in-
cluding Pupil Referral Units and Special Education needs.4 The remaining part
is transferred to the school individual budgets according to a “fair funding for-
mula”, which has the aim of providing the same amount of resources to schools
with similar characteristics.5
Though formulae vary, the Government imposes precise constraints on Local Au-
thorities. Importantly, Local Authorities need to allocate at least 75% of the
resources based on pupil numbers.6 Local Authorities then set the other criteria
for allocation of funds. Typically, these include: indicators of social deprivation
(for example the number of pupils who are FSME), the number of pupils with
special education needs (SEN), the number of pupils with English as an addi-
tional language, site and school factors (such as square meters taken up by school
buildings).
Though funding is primarily based on school intake, it is worth mentioning that
statistical evidence suggests that resources are correlated more with historical lev-
els of enrolment and deprivation rather than with yearly changes. For instance, a
report from the CfBT Education Trust (Sibieta et al., 2008) shows that an increase
in the number of FSME students enrolled in a school brings little, if any, extra
funding above the basic per-pupil amount. However, though the mechanism is not
perfect, it seems safe to say that it is closely resemble a quasi-market environment
in which resources are allocated on the basis of parents’ demand.
Teachers’ pay is also closely related to performance. Starting from 1999, the
UK Government introduced a performance-related pay scheme for teachers, with
pupils’ attainment as one of its key criteria. Specifically, to be eligible for bonuses
and apply for higher salaries, teachers have to demonstrate that they had reached
acceptable standards in five areas including knowledge and understanding of teach-
ing, teaching management and assessment, wider professional effectiveness profes-
sional characteristics and pupil progress.
4In the UK, a Pupil Referral Unit (PRU) is an establishment maintained by a local author-
ity which is specifically organised to provide education for children who are excluded, sick, or
otherwise unable to attend a mainstream or special maintained school.
5The funding through the fair funding formula makes up roughly 80% of school budget, while
the remaining 20% comes from specific grants from the central Government. Examples include:
the School Standards Grant, the School Development Grant and other Standard Fund grants.
6Generally speaking Local Authorities provide flat-rate amounts for the number of pupils in
each Key Stage, with more provided for later Key Stages. There are significant variations in the
absolute and relative amounts provided to different Key Stages, but secondary schools generally




The data used for the empirical analysis are in large part analogous to the one used
in chapter 1 of this thesis, where I provide a detailed description. I here summarise
only the main characteristics of the datasets, focusing on the the most relevant
for the purpose of this chapter. I use the Pupil Level Annual Census (PLASC), a
Census of English state school pupils, covering roughly 95% of the total population
of students. I focus on students in their transition between primary and secondary
school (i.e. between Year 6 and Year 7). The dataset reports information on
a number of individual characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, first language,
special education needs status and eligibility for free school meals. Importantly,
it reports pupils’ postcode of residence in the last year of primary school and the
unique identifier for the school attended.
Second, I use administrative data on English secondary schools reporting the exact
address of the establishment to assign to each student his two nearest schools. I
determine students’ eligibility for free transport computing the walking distance
from their postcodes to each of their three nearest schools. The dataset also
reports information on basic school characteristics, such as opening and closure
dates, total number of students and teachers, phase of education and type of school.
Unfortunately, information on total number of students enrolled and number of
teachers is available only for academic years 2005/2006-2008/2009.
As in chapter 1, I use the National Pupil Database (NPD) on students in Year
11 to construct a measure of school performance. The data report individual
standardized test scores (GCSE) in all subjects for the years 2004/2005-2010/2011.
For the purpose of this study, I define school quality as the average of English and
mathematics test scores in the last year of secondary school and standardize it
yearly to have a mean of zero and a unit standard deviation. It is worth mentioning
that, in using test scores of students who were already enrolled at the time of the
reform, I alleviate the concern stemming from changes in student body composition
resulting from the policy change.
Finally, I use publicly available data on school budgets to obtain information on
school yearly revenues and expenditures. The data provide school balances and
those as a percentage of school total revenues. From these I am able to infer school
total revenues and spending. As a shortcoming, I am not able to infer revenues





Panel A of table 2.1 reports schools’ characteristics.7 As shown in chapter 1,
more than 50% are community schools, which are controlled and financed directly
by the Local Authorities. A large share of the remaining schools are foundation
schools run by a governing body or a charitable foundation, which has primary
responsibility for hiring staff and admitting students. On average, each school
enrols roughly 150 new students every year, going from a minimum of 2 in the
bottom decile of the distribution to almost 275 in the largest schools.
The next row of Panel A reports school quality. There is large variation in school
performance: the best schools perform 1.4 standard deviations better than the
average and above 2 standard deviations above the bottom decile.
Finally, the last two rows report school per-pupil revenues and spending. Schools
receive £4,988 per student and spend on average £4,766 per student. However, as
mentioned, per-pupil resources depend highly on students’ characteristics and the
area deprivation index. This implies that there is high heterogeneity in the actual
amount of resources available. Schools in the bottom decile of the distribution
receive on average £2,825 per students, compared to the almost £8,000 received
by those in the top 10%. Similarly, school expenditures vary largely, with richest
schools spending almost £5,000 more per student than the ones in the bottom
decile.8
Panel B of the table shows schools’ pupil composition. In the average school
80% of first year students are white British, more than 88% are English speakers
and roughly 20% of them are FSM eligible. Students’ characteristics vary widely,
suggesting that there is significant sorting of pupils across schools. The share
of white British students enrolled in the first year goes from 16% in the bottom
percentile to a maximum of over 98%. Similarly, in 10% of schools the proportion
of students speaking English as a first language is 36%, while in the top 10% of
the distribution is very close to 100%.
Student composition also varies greatly in respect of parental income. In the
wealthiest schools, the percentage of FSME pupils is as low as 1%. On the other
hand, more disadvantaged schools enrol nearly 60% of FSME students.
7This table is partially borrowed from chapter 1 of the thesis.
8 Figure 2.A3 in the Appendix shows the average amount of per-pupil spending by LA on the
left and the average school quality by LA on the right.
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Overall, these figures suggest that English schools are highly heterogeneous in
terms of performance, pupils’ composition and available resources.
2.4 Empirical strategy
The identification of the effects of school competition on performance relies on
the arguably exogenous shock generated by the Free Transport policy. I define
the treatment variable at the school level as the percentage of students eligible for
free transport in a school catchment area. Empirically, I estimate a reduced form
differences-in-differences model comparing schools with different shares of eligible
students before and after the programme. To this end, I define eligible students as
in chapter 1 and a school catchment area as all children due to enrol in secondary
school for whom the school is the closest from home.9 Ignoring other covariates,
the empirical specification takes the form
yit = δ0 + δ1(FTi ∗ dt) + δ2(FT−i ∗ dt) + ηi + ηt + υit (2.1)
where FTi is the percentage of students eligible for free transport in school i’s
catchment area and dt a dummy for observation post reform. The variable FTi
is measured pre treatment (the average of years 2004/2005-2006/2007) to avoid
potential bias due to migration. Similarly, the term FT−i is the percentage of
students due to enrol in secondary school living in the catchment area of schools
other than school i who are eligible for free transport to school i. This term aims
at controlling for the decrease in competitive pressure due to students from other
catchment areas who could now potentially flee to school i. The outcome variable
yit is either school enrolment, school resources or a measure of school performance,
defined as above. Finally, the terms ηi and ηt are school and time fixed effects,
respectively.10 The parameter δ1 identifies the effect of the programme.
9Figure 2.A1 in the Appendix reports the average share of eligible students by Local Authority.
10One could argue that, as the student composition may itself change as a result of the policy,
the estimates of school performance may be biased. However, it is worth emphasising again
that the analysis on school performance relies on the test scores of students who hence enrolled
in secondary school before 2008 and were not affected by the Free Transport Policy in their
choice of school. Though students could potentially change school during their studies in order
to benefit from the free transport, this seems highly unlikely. To test this directly, table 2.A1 in
the Appendix shows the results of a regression of the form:
xit = γ0 + γ1(FTi ∗ dt) + γ2(FT−i ∗ dt) + ηi + ηt + νit
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The key identifying assumption of the differences-in-differences requires that, in
the absence of the policy, changes in the outcome variables would have been the
same before and after 2007/2008 in schools with a high and a low fraction of eligible
students. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not directly testable. As an attempt to
control for potential latent trends in school behaviour, in the regressions I include a
vector of school observable characteristics, including the fraction of white British
pupils, the fraction of FSME students, the fraction of native English students
enrolled in Year 11 and the total number of students in the school catchment
area. Finally, I include Local Authority X time fixed effects, which absorb all time
variant characteristics at the Local Authority-year level.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Enrolment
This section begins by testing whether the introduction of free transport has an
effect on school enrolment, i.e. if the increase in competition pressure on schools
results in an actual decline in student numbers. Note that, while chapter 1 esti-
mates the differential probability of enrolling at the nearest school as a result of
the Free Transport policy, this chapter focuses more directly the general equilib-
rium effects on schools. In particular, it is not obvious that, as eligible students
are less likely to attend the nearest school in the post reform period (as shown in
chapter 1), these schools would actually experience an overall decline in enrolment.
Table 2.2 shows the estimates of equation 2.1 on school total enrolment in the
first year of secondary school (columns 1 to 4) and on FSME students enrolment
(columns 5 to 8) in the first year of secondary school. In the first specification
(columns 1 and 5) I control only for the number of students in the catchment area,
time fixed effects and school fixed effects. Results show a clear negative effect of
the policy on schools’ first year enrolment, with a coefficient of 0.470 (significant
at the 1% level). The same regression on the enrolment of FSME students shows
that a fair share of the decline in enrolment is due to a decrease in the number of
FSME pupils.
where xit are the characteristics of students attending the last year of secondary school in school
i at time t. Estimates suggest that the (observable) characteristics of last year students did not
change as a result of the programme, speaking in favour of the fact that no migration took place.
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These results imply that an increase of 1 percentage point (p.p.) in the school’s
percentage of eligible student in their catchment area results in a decrease in first
year total enrolment of 0.47 students. Similarly, a 1 p.p. increase in the percentage
of eligible students is associated with a 0.13 decrease in the enrolment of FSME in
the first year. To give a sense of the magnitude of these estimates, this implies that
moving from the average of 5 to 7 students eligible for free transport in a school
catchment area will result in a decline in first year enrolment of 0.47 students, 0.13
of which are FSME.
Consistently, both coefficients on the term FT−i ∗ dt , capturing the potential
increase in enrolment after the reform, are positive and on the order of 0.056
and 0.021, respectively. This implies that an increase of 1 p.p. increase in the
percentage of eligible students in other schools’ catchment areas should lead to
an increase of 0.056 in total enrolment and 0.021 increase in FSME enrolment.
However, estimates are not precise and non significant at conventional levels.
As mentioned, the crucial assumption of the differences-in-differences strategy is
that, in the absence of the programme, changes in the outcome variables would
have been the same in schools with high and low shares of eligible students. Hence,
some caution is needed in interpreting the results in columns 1 and 5, as the spec-
ification may not fully control for potential latent trends in the outcome variable.
In other words, the estimates could capture effects other than the genuine impact
of the programme. In an attempt to alleviate this concern, the specifications in
columns 2 and 6 control for school time varying characteristics. Reassuringly, all
coefficients are unchanged. As a further test, specifications in columns 3 and 7
include, in addition to school fixed effects, Local Authority X time dummies to con-
trol for Local Authorities time specific effects. Though the specification is highly
demanding, the estimates on both total enrolment and FSME student enrolment
remain significant and similar to the ones prsented above. A 1 p.p. increase in the
percentage of eligible students is associated with a 0.43 decrease in first year total
enrolment and a 0.14 decrease in FSME student enrolment. The fact that coef-
ficients do not change significantly after the inclusion of Local Authority X time
fixed effects speaks in favour of the validity of the identification strategy. Finally,
columns 4 and 8 show results of the most saturated specification including school
fixed effects, Local Authority X time fixed effects and school characteristics. As
before, the inclusion of additional controls does not have a significant impact and
estimates are similar to the ones in columns 3 and 7.
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Overall, results suggest that the free transport programme had a non negligible
impact on the enrolment rates of affected schools.
2.5.2 School resources
As discussed at length above, a significant share of school funding follows the
pupil, implying that large schools should enjoy higher resources. An additional
fraction of school funding is allocated depending on students’ characteristics, being
considerably higher if they are from a deprived background or if they have special
education needs.11
This section explores precisely the effect of the programme on both total and per-
pupil revenues, spending and teacher/pupil ratio for the academic years 2005/2006-
2008/2009, years for which both data on school resources and teachers’ numbers
are available. The number of observations in the sample decreases from above
17,000 to just above 11,000. This is due, along with the missing years 2004/2005
and 2009/2010-2010/2011, to the to the limitations of the data, which do not
allow to compute revenues and expenditures for schools reporting a balance of
zero (these account for roughly 6% of the sample).12 13
As one might be worried that observations are not missing at random, table 2.3
investigates the margin of selection. Specifically, it reports results of a regression
of a dummy for missing values on the treatment variable, using the same specifica-
tions of table 2.2. All coefficients are zero e not statistically significant, suggesting
that selection is not a major source of concern. An additional issue is that the
restricted sample of schools used for this analysis may not be representative. Ta-
ble 2.A2 in the Appendix shows that the results on school enrolment and school
performance are virtually unchanged when restricting to schools with no missing
values in revenues/expenditures, reassuring on the fact that the schools used in
this analysis are still representative of the whole sample.
Column 1 of table 2.4 reports the estimates on school log revenues, using the most
saturated specification of table 2.2, which include school characteristics, school
11The English funding system has often been compared to the US voucher system, positively
discriminating in favour of more disadvantaged students. See, for instance, Le Grand (2003).
12See section 2.3 for details.
13Though information on school revenues and expenditures is available also for years 2004/2005
and 2010/2011, for consistency I restrict the sample to the years for which the number of teachers
and students is available. Estimates on revenues and expenditures including all available years
do not change significantly.
59
Chapter 2
fixed effects and Local Authority X time fixed effects. Interestingly, an equally
sized negative effect emerges on both school revenues and spending, suggesting
that school funding did adapt to the new (lower) enrolment. Specifically, a 1
p.p. increase in the percentage of eligible students leads to a 0.2% decrease in
the amount of total revenues and expenditures. This implies that an additional 2
students eligible for free transport in the school catchment area result in a decline
of roughly £9,500 in school revenues and of £9,100 in expenditures. Considering
that the average per-pupil revenues and spending are, respectively, £4,988 and
£4,766, these results provide evidence on how school resources are actually closely
linked to enrolment numbers. Column 3 shows the effect of the programme on
the number of school full time equivalent teachers. Results suggest that the policy
has a significant negative impact on the total amount of teaching resources in the
school, with a coefficient of -0.08. In particular, 25 additional students eligible
for free transport in the catchment area would result in roughly one less teacher
employed in the school, suggesting that schools do downsize their staff in response
to a decline in the enrolment numbers. Overall, these results support the argu-
ment that school resources are allocated depending largely on student numbers.
Importantly to the purpose of this study, this suggests that schools do indeed
have financial incentives to attract additional students and may hence respond to
higher competition pressure by improving their performance in terms of teaching
quality.
As an additional check, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates on the log per-pupil
revenues, log per-pupil spending and teacher-pupil ratio. Per-pupil revenues and
spending are defined as the total amount of yearly revenues and expenditures
divided by the total number of pupils enrolled in the school. The teacher/pupil
ratio is defined as the number of full time equivalent teachers per pupil enrolled at
the school. A 1 p.p. increase in the fraction of eligible students is associated with
a 0.1% increase in per-pupil revenues and spending. Consistent with the results in
columns 1 to 3, these estimates imply a nearly zero change in per-pupil revenues
and expenditures. Finally, column 6 confirms that the policy reform did not have
significant effects on schools’ teacher-pupil ratio.
Overall, these results suggest that the decrease in enrolment induced by the policy
has a significant impact on school total resources, consistent with a resources




The crucial question of the chapter is whether the increase in the competitive
pressure generated by the Free Transport policy has any effect on the performance
of affected schools in terms of students’ test scores.
It is worth stressing again that school quality is based on the test scores of students
who were already enrolled in the school prior the implementation of the Free
Transport programme. Indeed, if we were to assess performance changes based
on newly enrolled students, we may capture compositional effects induced by the
policy (i.e. changes in student body composition), rather than the genuine effect
of the Free Transport programme.
The last column of table 2.4 reports the results for school quality, using the most
saturated specification of table 2.2. Estimates imply that a 1 p.p. increase in
the percentage of eligible student increases school performance by 0.004 standard
deviations, corresponding to roughly 2 additional students, would boost school
performance by 0.4% of a standard deviation. Though these estimates might, at
first sight, seem large, one should consider that extending free transport to the
totality of FSME students (from 3% to 15% of school total enrolment), would still
imply a modest increase of 4.8% of a standard deviation in school performance.14
2.6 Falsification test
The identification strategy relies on the assumption of no latent trends in the
outcome variables. In an attempt to control for this, I included in the regressions
school fixed effects and Local Authorities X time fixed effects, which absorb all
time invariant characteristics at the school level and time varying characteristics
at the Local Authority level. However, there might still be time variant trends at
the school level which are not taken into account in the estimates.
In an attempt to rule this out, table 2.5 presents a falsification test for the outcome
variables presented so far.
14Figure 2.A4 in the Appendix shows the residuals of a regression of school quality on time,
school and Local Authority X time fixed effects. The graphs reports on the x-axis the fraction
of eligible students in the school potential pool of first year enrolment and on the y-axis the
change in performance after the implementation of the programme. There is a clear positive
relationship between the change in school quality and the percentage of students eligible for free
transport living near the school.
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As discussed in chapter 1, the Free Transport policy does not target students
residing in London and as such we should not observe any significant effect on the
enrolment and quality patterns of London schools.
Table 2.5 shows the estimates for schools based in Greater London, using the same
specification of table 2.2. All coefficients are virtually zero, suggesting that the
policy reform does not have a significant effect on the outcomes of London schools,
speaking in favour of the validity of the identification strategy.
2.7 Heterogeneous and non-linear effects
Table 2.6 reports the estimates of school quality by type of school. As mentioned,
there are several types of secondary schools in England, which differ in the degree
of management freedom. The main types of schools are community schools, con-
trolled by the local council; foundation schools, voluntary controlled and voluntary
aided school, and academies. While for community and voluntary aided schools the
Local Authority is directly responsible for selecting the staff, in voluntary, foun-
dation and academy schools the governing body is in charge of hiring and student
admissions.15 Intuitively, schools with higher freedom should be more likely to re-
spond to competition and improve their performance than other schools. I hence
explore heterogeneous effects depending on school managerial freedom, dividing
the sample of schools into “independent” schools (i.e. foundation schools, volun-
tary controlled schools and academies) and “other” (i.e. community and voluntary
aided schools).
Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of table 2.6 show the estimates for total enrolment and
FSME enrolment for the two sub-samples of schools. The results are slightly
larger for schools with more management freedom, suggesting that they suffered
more from the increase in competitive pressure compared to other schools.
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates of school quality. The coefficient is signif-
icantly larger for schools with management freedom than for other schools. A 1
15Foundation schools’ land and buildings are owned by the governing body or by a charitable
foundation. Voluntary Aided schools are linked to a variety of organisations. A large share of
them are faith schools (typically the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church). The
charitable foundation contributes towards the capital costs of the school (typically 10%), and
appoints a majority of the school governors. Voluntary Controlled schools are schools with the
land and buildings often owned by a charitable foundation. However, the local authority employs
the schools’ staff and has primary responsibility for admissions.
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p.p. increase in the percentage of eligible students in schools with more manage-
ment freedom is associated with a 0.008 standard deviations increase in quality,
compared to a 0.003 increase in other schools. Overall, these results suggest that
schools that enjoy higher management freedom respond more to competitive pres-
sure, though estimates are still economically modest.
2.8 Summary and conclusions
This chapter explores the effects of the Free Transport Policy described in chapter
1 on school behaviour. The policy aimed at increasing school choice for low income
student, by decreasing the cost of travelling to further away schools. Advocates of
choice argue that higher choice should increase competition among schools, leading
to an improvement in school performance. However, this argument is valid as long
as schools have incentives to attract students, typically because the amount of
resources available is closely linked to enrolment numbers. This chapter explores
precisely these margins.
Using the same data as in chapter 1, I define a school catchment area as the number
of children in the last year of primary school (i.e. those due to enrol at secondary
school) for whom the school is the nearest from home. The competition measure
assigned to each school is then computed as the average percentage of children
living in the catchment area who are eligible for free transport to further away
schools. To avoid bias due to students’ migration in response to the policy, I use a
pre treatment variable, that is, the average for the pre reform years. I identify the
effect of the programme through a reduced form differences-in-differences approach
comparing schools with a high percentage of eligible students with schools with
a low percentage of eligible students before and after the implementation of the
Free Transport policy.
Consistent with results in chapter 1, estimates show that enrolment declines more
in schools with a high percentage of eligible students in the catchment area. More-
over, resources are closely linked to pupil numbers, suggesting that schools do have
financial incentives to attract additional students. Nonetheless, the increase in
competition has only a modest effect on school performance. This might be due
to the limited “bite” of the policy under analysis, which targets only a small share
of low income students. On the other hand, one could also think that the beneficial
effects of increased competition are more likely to emerge in the long run, when
schools had the time to adjust their behaviour. However, though both arguments
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are valid, a modest effect is consistent with the previous literature, suggesting that




Table 2.1: School characteristics
All schools Bottom decile Top decile
Panel A: Schools
Number of schools 3,323
Community schools (%) 50.23
Academies (%) 7.52
Foundation schools (%) 23.14
Voluntary schools (%) 2.29
Other schools (%) 16.28
Number of new enrolments 147.19 2.07 274.86
Average exit cohorts’ test scores 0.22 -0.83 1.64
Per-pupil revenues (£) 4,988 2,825 7,933
Per-pupil spending (£) 4,766 2,699 7,616
Panel B: Students’ composition
White British (%) 79.24 15.58 98.23
FSME (%) 19.29 1.33 56.63
Females (%) 48.72 10.59 90.45
English speakers (%) 88.49 36.00 99.86
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data. The table reports summary statistics for the
period 2004/2005-2010/2011. School quality is defined as the average of GCSE test scores in























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Sample selection: missing values in revenues or expenditures
[1] [2] [3] [4]
FTi ∗ dt -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FT−i ∗ dt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) number of students -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
in catchment area (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% White British 0.033 0.039
(0.040) (0.037)
% English speakers -0.061 -0.050
(0.037) (0.035)
% FSME 0.171* 0.159*
(0.089) (0.089)
N 17,210 17,210 17,210 17,210
Notes: See table 2.2. The dependent variable is defined as a dummy
equal to 1 if school i displays missing values in the revenues and









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure 2.A1: Fraction of eligible students by LA (quartiles)




Figure 2.A2: School choice index and school quality by LA (quartiles)
Notes: Author’s calculations on PLASC data or the period 2004/2005-
2010/2011. The school choice index is based on a Herfindhal index of schools’









Figure 2.A3: School per-pupil spending and school quality by LA (quartiles)




Figure 2.A4: Change in school quality by share of eligible students (2005-2011)
Notes: Before-after change in school quality. Residuals from a regression




Table 2.A1: The effect of the Free Transport policy on school characteristics
(Year 11)
White British English speakers FSME
[1] [2] [3]
FTi ∗ dt 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FT−i ∗ dt -0.000** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 17,210 17,210 17,210



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Externalities at the Workplace:
Evidence from the Italian Private
Sector
3.1 Introduction
Does the work environment affect workers’ productivity? Do absenteeist co-
workers increase or decrease our absenteeism? The aim of this chapter is to provide
evidence of the impact of group effects on workers’ propensity to shirk.
When workers are rewarded based on team effort the possibility arises that indi-
viduals free ride. This reduces workers’ incentives to exert effort, lowering overall
productivity. Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that the presence of social effects,
defined in their paper as peer pressure or shame, could help mitigate the detri-
mental effects of free riding, even in the absence of explicit economic incentives.1
In their pioneering study Rasul et al. (2005) show evidence of social preferences
by comparing workers’ productivity under different pay schemes. They find that
average productivity is sensibly lower under relative incentives, where individual
effort imposes negative externalities on others, than under piece rate, where it does
not. More recently, in an influential paper Mas and Moretti (2009) use high fre-
quency data on cashiers of a large supermarket’s to explore how the productivity
of a worker is affected by the productivity of co-workers in the same shift. They
find evidence of positive productivity spillovers and conclude that social pressure
1Past literature shows that economic incentives can restore the efficient outcome. On the role
of economic incentives see, among the others, Hamilton et al. (2003).
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is the main channel explaining their results.2 Differently from the analysis in this
chapter, however, their paper focuses on a specific setting where employees work
individually, rather than on the more common case of team work. Moreover, re-
sults on the US may be difficult to extend to the European labour market, where
the employment protection legislation is more stringent and possibly the work
ethic different.
In order to investigate externalities in shirking, I use a large dataset on social
security administrative records, which covers a representative sample of all private
sector employees in Italy. Obviously, shirking is not recorded in the data. However,
in using data for Italy, where sick leave is covered by public insurance, I circumvent
the problem using workers’ absence rate as a proxy. Indeed, there is a large amount
of evidence that workers absences for sick leave often cover shirking.3 Among
others, Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) show that German employees are more
likely to take sick leave when job security increases. This is also found by Ichino
and Riphahn (2005) using data on a large Italian bank.4 In the context teachers’
labour market, Jacob (2010) explores the effects of a policy change in Chicago’s
public schools, which gave principals more flexibility in dismissing probationary
teachers, showing an average decrease in absence rates of 10% in the post reform
period. Finally, specifically looking at Italy, D’Amuri (2011) investigates the effects
of the reform of the disciplinary action on sick leave among public sector workers.
The reform aimed at lowering absenteeism through financial penalties (the loss of
every bonus for the first 10 days of sick leave) and stricter monitoring. Comparing
private and public workers’ absenteeism before and after the reform, he finds that
the implementation of the policy yielded a 26% decrease in sick leave taken by
public sector workers.5
2Other studies attempt to measure group effects employing lab experiments. See, for example:
Falk et al. (2005); Falk and Ichino (2006) and Falk et al. (2013).
3There is a large body of literature (see, for example, Gruber, 2011) documenting the benefits
of sick leave insurance. Among others factors, insurance makes workers more likely to engage
in risky activities, to the advantage of economic production and growth. In addition, sick leave
insurance is desirable also from the firms’ prospective, as it reduces the contagion effects due to
presenteeism (sick employees showing up at work).
4More generally, Lusinyan and Bonato (2007) compare a number of developed countries,
showing the presence of a significant U-shaped relationship between the development of the
welfare system and absence rates.
5 For additional evidence on the unintended consequences of extensive social security refer
to the literature on unemployment insurance (UI) in the US. For instance, Meyer (1990) and
Gruber (1997) report that the share of workers exiting unemployment increases from 5-7% to
16.5% once the UI benefits run out. Other studies on the unintended consequences of social
insurance include: Lazear (1990) on the impact of job security provisions on unemployment;
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) on the optimal level of unemployment insurance; Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001) on the effects of the American Disabilities Act and Krueger and Meyer (2002) on
the effects of social insurance on labour supply.
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This chapter contributes to the literature on peer effect and absenteeism by in-
vestigating directly group effects in shirking. There are three main challenges in
estimating social effects: the reflection problem, correlated effects and endogenous
sorting (Manski, 1993). The former is the classic problem of simultaneous equa-
tion: co-workers’ behaviour affects individual behaviour, but the opposite is also
true. Correlated effects arise when individuals behave similarly because they share
the same institutional environment and face common shocks. Finally, workers may
sort endogenously into occupations and firms according to their unobservable char-
acteristics, such as ability and motivation. Each of them can give rise to a bias in
the estimates of the endogenous effects.
To deal with these issues, the identification strategy relies on arguably exogenous
variation in co-workers’ productivity induced by compositional changes in firms’
employment due to new hirings. In the spirit of Mas and Moretti (2009), I use
new co-workers’ permanent absenteeism, which I recover from a regression of work-
ers’ absenteeism on individual characteristics, as a proxy for current co-workers’
shirking. This addresses the simultaneity issue and reduces the risk of bias due to
workers facing common shocks. I finally attempt to control for endogenous sorting
by explicitly controlling in the regression for a rich array of workers’ characteristics.
The empirical results show evidence of the presence of positive spillovers, with
workers increasing their absence rates by at least 0.23 p.p. in response to a 10 p.p.
increase in coworkers’ sick leave.
The paper unfolds as follows: in sections 3.2 and 3.3 I describe the institutional
background and present basic descriptive evidence. Section 3.4 introduces a simple
model of teamwork with externalities. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present the identifi-
cation strategy and show results on the estimated spillovers effects. Section 3.7
explores sanctioning for shirking. The last section summarises and concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
Sick leave insurance in Italy works through two channels: social security (INPS,
Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale) and collective agreements (CCNL,
Contratti Collettivi Nazionali di Lavoro). INPS provides sick leave indemnity
to all salaried workers with the exception of managers and white collar workers
employed in the industry sector.6
6For these workers is the firm to pay the indemnity, according to the collective agreements.
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In order to be eligible for public insurance, both the firm and the employees have
to pay a mandatory tax of respectively 32.7% and 9.19% of the workers’ gross
salary.7 Social security covers all sick leave episodes between 4 and 180 days,
remitting 50% of the gross monthly wage for the first 16 days and 66.66% for
the remaining period. Most of the collective agreements include an additional
payment (in charge of the employer) of up to 100% of the salary and extend the
payment to the first three days of sick leave. Only when the employer or INPS
can directly prove shirking, is the indemnity automatically suspended and the
employer is legally entitled to dismiss the worker without notice. Alternatively, a
firm can legally dismiss workers if they extend sick leave beyond the period allowed
by the collective agreements (periodo di comporto), which usually exceeds the 180
days covered by social security.8
Though absenteeist workers represent a significant monetary cost for firms, it
not easy for firms to dismiss absenteeist employees. Italy, like many European
countries, displays a stringent employment protection legislation (OECD, 1999).9
After a probationary period of three months, the firm is entitled to dismiss its
employees only for “just cause”, which the law defines as “significantly inadequate
fulfilment of the employee’s tasks specified in the contract” (Law No. 604 of 1966).
Employment courts ultimately evaluate the cause on the basis of the evidence
provided by the firm, which thus faces the risk of long and costly trials. In the
absence of just cause, the firm is forced to re-hire the employee and pay the whole
amount of lost wages and contributions plus a fine, amounting to 200% of lost social
security. Alternatively, the worker has the option of resigning, subject to a refund
of a minimum of 15 months pay. The law is slightly less stringent concerning firms
with fewer than 15 employees. In cases of unfair dismissal, workers are entitled to
receive a payment of up to a maximum of six months of wages, without any right to
re-employment. Ichino et al. (2003) offer compelling evidence of the implications
of these dismissal costs by showing that, in 17 years, a large Italian bank dismissed
just over 400 workers out of a labour force of 26,000 employees.
In summary, the legislation regarding sick leave has important implications for
this study. Full insurance and stringent employment protection, along with the
impossibility for the employer of perfectly distinguishing sick leave from shirking,
7The payment, which is compulsory for workers employed in the private sector, also entitles
the employee to pensions, disability indemnities, maternity leave payments and low income
benefits
8To avoid strategic behaviour, the periodo di comporto applies to all episodes close in time,
for which sick leave days are counted as if they were a single episode.
9For a detailed description of the Italian employment protection legislation see, among others,
Ichino and Riphahn (2005).
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imply that workers will have incentives to take advantage of sick leave. Hence, in
the context analysed here, absences due to sick leave are likely to represent a good
proxy for shirking.
3.3 Data
This paper uses data on Italian workers employed in the private sector in the period
1990-2002. The panel includes 146,806 workers randomly selected on the basis of
their date of birth (1st of March and 1st of October) and reports information on
sick leave spells and a rich set of demographic characteristics (including gender,
year of birth, province of birth, gross monthly earnings, province of work and
workers’ CCNL).10
Despite providing detailed information on workers’ characteristics, the dataset has
some drawbacks. First, and most importantly, sick leave is defined as a dummy
for whether the worker was absent at any time and for any number of days in
the year. This implies that I am not able to infer the intensive margin of workers’
absenteeism. Second, the sick leave variable does not include episodes shorter than
three days, as they are not covered by social security. Specifically, I only observe
sick leave episodes for which the worker is required to provide a medical certificate.
This may undermine the identification of shirking, as absenteeist workers could
strategically avoid longer periods of absence to decrease the probability of being
caught.
Finally, the dataset covers only a sample of private sector workers. As I do not
observe the universe of workers, I may not be able to provide a good description of
co-workers’ composition. Moreover, observing only a random sample of co-workers
induces an error ridden measure of peers’ absenteeism at the workplace. I address
this issue and suggest a possible solution in the following sections.
3.3.1 Sick leave and workers’ characteristics
Table 3.1 shows the probability of taking sick leave by worker characteristics. The
unit of observation is the worker employed in a given establishment in a given
10As Italian sick leave insurance does not cover managers and white collar workers employed
in the industry sector, I dropped these workers from the original dataset. This decreases the
sample to a total of 145,168 workers.
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year, for which the table reports means for the period 1990-2002. Panel A focuses
on demographic characteristics and panel B on jobs’ characteristics. The whole
sample counts 1,090,034 worker-establishment-year observations in the period of
the analysis. 14.25% of male workers take sick leave at least once every year,
compared to only 11.89% of females. Looking at the geographic distribution of
workers taking sick leave, workers born in the North display slightly higher levels
of absenteeism compared to workers in the South. Similarly, more than 14% of
workers employed in the Northern regions are absent at least once in the year,
compared to only 13% in the Center and 11% in the South.11
Blue collars workers are significantly more likely to take sick leave than white collar
workers with a probability in the order of 18% compared to only 4% of white collar
employees. This may follows from the fact that, given the nature of the occupation,
blue collar workers are usually at a higher risk of injuries and illness. On the other
hand, as blue collars make a large share of a firm’s workforce, monitoring their
effort may be difficult and the probability of punishment for shirking could be low.
This may push them to take advantage of sick leave.
Unsurprisingly, high tenured workers display higher absence rates compared to low
tenured ones. As high tenured workers are protected against dismissal by law, the
risk of repercussions is reasonably small, providing incentives to increase absences.
Interestingly, however, the opposite relationship emerges with respect to workers’
experience, as more experienced workers are roughly 3 percentage points less likely
to take sick leave.
3.3.2 Movers and incumbents
In the remainder of this section I present descriptive statistics on the sample of
workers that my analysis focuses on. As stated before, the identification strategy
of this paper relies on the exogenous change in coworkers’ composition within
an establishment that follows the introduction of a new worker (mover). This
decreases the sample to the 32.35% of workers who have at least one new co-
worker in the period of the analysis.
Figure 3.1 shows the average number of new co-workers per incumbent worker per
year in the data, conditional upon having a new co-worker. On average, more than
70% of incumbents has no more than one new co-worker in a year, slightly more
than 10% are joined by 2 new co-workers and the remaining 20% by more than 2.
11These figures contrast with the findings of Ichino and Maggi (2000).
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Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the incumbents and the movers.
Incumbent workers are more than double as likely to take sick leave as movers,
displaying a probability of nearly 15% compared to 7% of movers. However, this
may be partially explained by the higher number of months worked per year among
stayers, theirs being almost twice those worked by movers. Movers are also younger
and on lower wages than incumbents, as well as less experienced.12
Looking at workers’ region of birth and work, there is evidence of significant mi-
gration from the Southern to the wealthier Northern regions of Italy: while only
66% of incumbents and 62% of movers were born in the North, 83% of incumbents
and 85% of movers are employed there.
3.4 A model of teamwork with externalities
I start from a simple model of teamwork shedding light on the incentives to shirk
in the presence and absence of externalities. Consider a setting with 2 identical
workers A and B and assume that there are no group effects.13 Worker A maxi-
mizes his expected utility, given by the wage minus the cost of exerting effort. I
assume that workers get paid a fixed salary and have a probability P<1 of keep-
ing their job, which depends on their own and co-workers’ effort. Note that the
implications of the model do not change if I assume that workers are paid based
on a function of their own effort; however, pay-to-performance schemes are quite
rare in the Italian context. Defining effort as e = 1−a, where a is the chosen level
of absences, worker A maximizes his expected utility
UA(eA, eB) = wP (eA, eB)− C(eA)
where w denotes the fixed wage, P (eA) is the probability of keeping the job and
C(eA) is the cost function. Assume further, as standard in the literature, that
P1(eA, eB)>0, P11(eA, eB)<0, C1(eA) > 0 and C11(eA) > 0. The optimal eA is
determined by the first order condition
wP1(eA, eB) = C1(eA)
12By construction, movers display 0 years of tenure.
13The setting is similar to the one suggested by Hölmstrom (1981)
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As my empirical strategy exploits an exogenous variation in co-workers’ effort, the
partial derivative of optimal eA with respect to eB determines worker A’s optimal






As P11(eA, eB)<0 and C11(eA) > 0, the denominator of the expression above is un-
ambiguously negative. The sign of the numerator depends on the sign of the cross
derivative P12. Consider the simplest case in which the two workers are substitute
in the production function and the probability of retaining the job depends on the
total level of output. In this case the cross derivative P12 will be negative, implying
that worker’s A marginal returns to effort in terms of probability of keeping the
job decrease as the effort of worker B increases. As a result, an increase in worker
B’s effort will have a negative impact on worker A’s optimal level of effort, leading
to the classic free riding problem.14
Consider now the case in which workers’ own cost of effort depends on co-workers’
effort. For instance, workers may find it costly to exert effort when the average level
of effort is low; in other words, they may be more willing to work harder when the
working environment is productive. In the presence of such group effects, workers
maximize the following utility function:
UA(eA, eB) = wP (eA, eB)− C(eA, eB)
I assume C12(eA, eB) < 0, implying that worker A’s marginal cost of effort is
decreasing the higher the level of worker B’s effort. Worker A’s optimal level of
effort is given by the FOC
wP1(eA, eB) = C1(eA, eB)




C12(eA, eB)− wP12(eA, eB)
wP11(eA, eB)− C11(eA, eB)
14If the two workers are complements in the production function the implications would be the
opposite. In this case the cross derivative P12(eA, eB) will be positive, implying that workers’
effort increases with the average effort in the establishment.
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The denominator of this expression is still negative. Focusing again on the case
of substitute workers, C12 < 0 and P12 < 0, implying that the numerator can
take both positive or negative sign. Hence, the sign of the cross derivative is
ambiguous, implying that an increase in worker B’s absenteeism could result either
in an increase or a decrease in worker A’s optimal level of effort.
In summary, the model has two main implications. First, in the absence of exter-
nalities, we should observe free riding. Second, externalities mitigate free riding
and, if strong enough, could completely offset it.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Consider a world with only two workers. Following the literature on spillovers,
workers’ absenteeism can be described by an equation of the form
yift = αi + β1y−ift + dt + df + εift (3.1)
where yit is worker’s i absence rate in year t, y−ift is the co-worker absenteeism, dt
are time fixed effects, df are firm fixed effects and εift is an individual level error
term. The term αi defines individual fixed effects capturing the time invariant
component of worker i’s absenteeism. The parameter β1 identifies the endogenous
effects, that is how co-workers’ absenteeism directly affects individual behavior.
However, the above parameter is likely to be biased, as it suffers from at least
three sources of endogeneity: correlated effects, reflection problem and endogenous
sorting (Manski, 1993).
Correlated effects arise when individuals behave similarly because they share the
same background or face a similar institutional environment. Reflexivity relates
to the classic problem of simultaneous equations: individual i’s behaviour affects
individual −i’s behaviour, but the opposite is also true. Finally, endogenous sort-
ing arises when workers sort into firms and occupations according to unobservable
characteristics. In all three cases, the exclusion restriction Cov(y−it, εit) = 0 will
be violated, implying that the estimate of the endogenous parameter β1 will be
biased. Controlling for firm fixed effects, ensures that the estimate of the β1 is
not contaminated by time invariant sorting and correlated effects. However, a
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remaining threat to the validity of the estimates arises from reflexivity and time
variant endogenous sorting.15
My empirical strategy consists in exploiting between-job movers’ to generate a
change in the composition of co-workers in the firm. The panel structure of the
dataset allows then to estimate a model analogous to the one employed by Mas
and Moretti (2009). The estimation strategy consists of two steps. The first step
of my analysis aims at computing the fixed component of movers’ absenteeism,
net of observable individual characteristics. I estimate the following equation:
y−ikt = α−i +X
′
−iktγ1 + dt + φk + ε−ikt (3.3)
where y−ikt is the absenteeism of between job movers, X−ikt are workers’ individual
characteristics, including age, gender, occupation, tenure and experience and φk
is a vector of firms fixed effects for any establishment in which the mover worked.
As a second step, I use the estimates of the fixed effects α−i as a proxy for worker
−i’s absenteeism in firm f at time t and estimate 3.1 in the following reduced form
equation
yift = αi + δ1α−i + dt + df + εift (3.4)
The residual challenge comes from endogenous sorting, implying that workers with
a given permanent level of absenteeism are not assigned at random to incumbents.
Specifically, the exclusion restriction is violated if movers’ permanent absenteeism
is correlated with incumbents’ or firms’ unobservable time varying characteristics
which also affect yift. Although I have no direct way of ruling out non random
assignment, I attempt circumvent this problem by probing the robustness of my
results to the inclusion of observable workers’ characteristics.16
15To see this, consider that worker −i’s absenteeism can be written as
y−ift = α−i + β1yift + dt + df + ε−ift (3.2)
This is the same expression of equation 3.1 for worker −i. Reflexivity implies that, as y−ift
is itself a function of yift, Cov(y−ift, εift) 6= 0. Correlated effects and endogenous sorting imply
that Cov(ε−ift, εift) 6= 0, leading to the violation of the exclusion restriction.
16The parameter δ1 in equation 3.4 identifies the effect of an increase in co-workers’ permanent
absenteeism on incumbents’ shirking. This is conceptually different from the interpretation of the
parameter β1 of equation 3.1, capturing the effect of an increase in co-workers’ contemporaneous
absenteeism on incumbents’ shirking. The two models are equally plausible and have different
interpretations concerning the nature of externalities. However, it is not possible to empirically
distinguish between them (Mas and Moretti, 2009).
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In a setting with N workers, the specification can be generalized in





+ dt + df + νift (3.5)
where the subscript m denotes between-job movers.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 3.3 presents estimates of equation 3.5 of workers’ absenteeism on co-workers’
sick leave episodes. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. To
deal with the fact that absence rates are reported as a dummy 0-1 for the prob-
ability of taking sick leave at least once in the year and obtain a more reliable
measure of true absenteeism, I define yift as the probability of taking sick leave in
a given year divided by the number of months worked. It is also worth mentioning
that the empirical strategy is constructed under the assumption of two workers.
This rules out spillover effects among incumbents following the hiring of the new
co-workers. However, in a context with N workers, the estimates of equation 3.5
are in reality a combination of a) the direct effect of movers on incumbents and
b) spillovers among incumbents. In this sense, one can think at the parameter of
equation 3.5 as a “reduced form” effect of movers on incumbents.
Column 1 reports results of a model controlling for individual X establishment
fixed effects and time fixed effects. Results show a clear positive effect of movers’
sick leave on workers’ absence rates, with a coefficient of 0.023 (significant at the
10% level). As absence rates are defined as the probability of taking sick leave in
a given year standardized by the number of months worked, these estimates imply
that a 10 p.p. increase in average co-workers’ absenteeism leads to an increase
of 0.23 p.p. in the probability of taking sick leave for the focal worker. Results
are consistent with the theoretical model in which workers free ride on peers, but
positive externalities on the cost of exerting effort offset the incentives to free ride.
Column 2 of the table attempts to control for potential endogenous sorting. The
specification includes a very rich set of workers’ predetermined characteristics (that
is, measured at time t− 1), including: age and gender dummies, province of birth
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dummies, occupation dummies (28 categories, as coded by INPS), monthly log
wage, dummies for the total number of co-workers in the sample and tenure and
experience dummies. As I do not directly observe workers’ true years of tenure
and experience, I proxy these with the number of years of tenure and experience in
my sample window. To control for left censoring, I add to the regression a dummy
for whether the worker was employed in the firm and a dummy for whether the
worker was in the labour market in the first year of the sample. Remarkably,
results remain virtually unchanged with respect to column 1.
Finally, specifications in columns 4 and 5 control for the number of new co-workers
(dummies) and the number of months incumbents have been exposed to at least
one mover (dummies). The latter is measured as the number of months both
the incumbent worker and the mover were employed in the establishment. These
specifications control for potential effect of different exposures to new co-workers,
both at the extensive and intensive margin. Both estimates are identical to the
ones of columns 1.
Overall, these estimates suggest that new co-workers’ absenteeism has a positive
and significant effect on own absenteeism of between 0.23 and 0.24 p.p., results
being robust to the inclusion of a rich set of workers’ background characteristics.
3.6.2 Discussion: sampling error
Sample data can give rise to an attenuation bias in the estimates of endogenous
effects. However, it is straightforward to correct for this bias when sampling is
random and the true size of the underlying population is known. As the data
consist of a random sample of workers drawn on the basis of their date of birth,
there is no reason to believe that, conditional upon firms’ establishment fixed
effects, workers’ characteristics should be systematically different from the ones of
the underlying population.
Ammermüeller and Pischke (2009) show that in this case the OLS estimator of





where n is the average establishment’s sampled size and N is the average estab-
lishment size in the underlying population. A shortcoming of this approach is that
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one needs to know the true size of firms’ establishment, which is not available from
the data. In order to get an estimate of the true N , I employ social security data
on the universe of private workers in the Italian region Veneto for the same years
covered by this analysis. These data do not report information on workers’ sick
leave, but share all other basic features of the dataset used here. I estimate the
average firm size by year and use such estimate to adjust the coefficient obtained
in the previous section.
The size of the effect increases substantially, suggesting that sampling measure-
ment error plays an important role in biasing the results towards zero. The ad-
justed coefficient is 0.126, implying that the probability of the average incumbent
taking sick leave would increase by 1.26 p.p. in response to a 10 p.p. change in
new co-workers’ absenteeism.
3.6.3 Heterogeneous effects
Although I assumed that the θ1 coefficient does not vary with individual charac-
teristics, there is no reason why this should be the case.
In this section I allow θ1 to vary across workers on the basis of age, gender,
occupation and wage as observed at time t-1. I also allow all control variables to
have different effects depending on the focal workers’ characteristics, by running
separate regressions for each group. Table 3.4 reports estimates of equation 3.5,
reverting to the most saturated specification of column 4 of table 3.3.
In columns 1 and 2 I estimate equation 3.5 separately for white and blue collar
workers. Only the coefficient on blue collar workers remains significant at the 5%
level, while the one on white collar workers is not significantly different from zero.
These results imply that a 10 p.p. increase in movers’ sick leave is associated with
a 0.3 p.p. increase in blue collars workers’ absences.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise with respect to incumbent workers’ age.
Young workers are defined as those with an age below the median at time t-1.
Estimates are significant only for older workers: a 10 p.p. increase in movers’ sick
leave is associated with a 0.5 p.p. increase in older workers’ episodes, while no
significant effect emerges in the sample of young workers. Columns 5 and 6 show
results for the men-women samples. Estimates are significant only with respect
to male workers, showing a 0.4 p.p. increase in absence rates in response to a 10
p.p. increase in movers’ sick leave. Overall, results suggest that the presence of
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social effects in the baseline estimates is mainly driven by blue collar, older and
male workers. Finally, columns 7 and 8 explore heterogeneous effects with respect
to incumbents’ wage: high waged workers, defined as those with a salary above
the median, increase their absence rates by roughly 0.4 p.p. in response to a 10
p.p increase in new co-workers’ absenteeism, while the coefficient drops to below
0.02 p.p. for low wage workers.
These results may simply reflect the higher propensity of these workers to emulate
co-workers, as well as a lower risk of punishment. Some groups of workers may
face a lower probability of being caught when shirking and face a lower risk of
being sanctioned. For instance, blue collar workers usually form a large share of a
firm’s workforce which could make monitoring harder. On the other hand, older
workers can usually take advantage of a more stringent employment protection,
which makes the probability of punishment lower than for younger co-workers. A
similar reasoning applies to high wage workers: assuming that wage is a reliable
proxy for skills and experience, highly skilled workers may be more difficult to
replace and hence less likely to be dismissed when shirking.
An additional, and potentially important source of heterogeneity in externalities if
given by firm size. Unfortunately, as the data only cover a sample of workers, I do
not observe the true firm size in the data. With this caveat in mind, I estimate the
effect separately for firms with, on average, at least 15 workers and for firms with,
on average, less than 15 workers over the sample. This gives a fairly balanced
split. It is worth mentioning that, given that I have a 1:180 sample, firms with
more than 15 (observed) workers are likely to be rather large firms.
Results reported in the last two columns of table 3.4 show that the effect is present
only in large firms. Specifically, a 10 p.p. increase in movers’ absenteeism is as-
sociated with a 0.67 p.p. in incumbents’ absence rate, while no significant effect
emerges with respect to firms with less than 15 workers (in the sample). One
possibility is that workers in large firms are less likely to be punished for shirking.
For instance, one extra absent work is likely to be less costly to large firms than
to small ones, where production can be severely affected if one employee is miss-
ing. Moreover, as the Italian employment protection legislation is more stringent
regarding large establishments, workers employed in these firms are less likely to
be punished for shirking and hence have more incentives to take advantage of sick
leave.17
17In Italy there is precisely a cutoff at 15 employees for dismissal at will.
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3.7 Punishment for absenteeism
The theoretical model introduced above implies that workers’ probability of re-
taining the job depends positively on both own and co-workers’ effort. If this was
the case, an increase in the average absenteeism in the firm should have a negative
effect on the probability of retaining the job. The second panel of table 3.5 re-
ports the estimates for three different measures of dismissals: (1) the probability
of being in the labour market one year after the new co-workers’ arrival (t+1 ),
(2) the probability of being employed in the same firm at time t+1 and (3) the
probability of being employed in the same firm at t+1, conditional upon being in
the labour market.
Overall, there is evidence, though weak, of sanction mechanisms: a 10 p.p. increase
in the average of new co-workers’ absenteeism leads to decrease in the probability
of being employed of 1.2 p.p.. Similarly, the effect on the probability of being
working in the same firm one year after is in the order of between -0.8 and -
1.8 p.p.. However, all coefficients are not statistically significant. One possible
explanation for the weakness of the estimates is that the stringent employment
protection prevents the employer from freely dismiss workers. On the other hand,
it is not possible to exclude the presence of other sanctioning mechanisms, such
as, for instance, slower career progression.
3.8 Summary and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to explore workers’ response to absenteeist peers. The
dataset consists of a random sample of Italian private sector employees, covering
the period 1990-2002. A simple theoretical model predicts workers’ free riding as
long as social effects are not in place. For instance, if the probability of keeping
the job is a function of collective effort, an increase in co-workers’ absence rates
should lead to a decrease in the worker’s absenteeism. However, in the presence
of externalities we could observe an increase in absenteeism in response to an in-
crease in co-workers’ absence rate. To test these hypotheses I use an identification
strategy that exploits between-job movers as an arguably exogenous variation in
the co-workers’ sick leave episodes.
Consistently with the presence of social effects in the spirit of Mas and Moretti
(2009), results show an increase in incumbent workers’ absence rates in the order
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of 0.24 p.p. in response to a 10 p.p. increase in new co-workers’ absences.
Interestingly, there is wide heterogeneity depending on firm size. In particular,
externalities are more pronounced in larger firms subject to a more stringent em-
ployment protection legislation, suggesting that a lower probability of punishment
may push workers to respond more to absenteeist co-workers taking advantage of
sick leave.
All these results however, are likely to suffer of a sample downward bias. Following
Ammermüeller and Pischke (2009), I correct for the bias estimating the average
firm size from a dataset collecting information for the universe of private sector
workers in the Italian region of Veneto. The adjusted coefficient shows that workers
increase their absence rates by 1.26 p.p. in response to a 10 p.p. increase in co-
workers’ absences, suggesting that measurement error plays a significant role in
the analysis.
I then test whether there is evidence of punishment for shirking. In the specific,
I estimate the effect of receiving absenteeist movers at time t on the probability
of being employed in the same firm the year after (t+1 ). Though there is weak
evidence of a negative impact of co-workers’ absenteeism on the probability of
keeping the job, coefficients are not statistically significant. I cannot, however,
exclude the presence of other unobservable sanctioning mechanisms.
One important caveat concerns the interpretation of these results. Social security
data only report absences above 3 days. As it is plausible that shirking most
likely relates to shorter episodes (an example is the so called “Monday effect”), the
results presented in this chapter may capture different mechanisms. For instance,
it may be possible that firms employing more unhealthy workers do experience
an increase in the probability of all employees being ill. Unfortunately, given
the data at hand, it is not possible to rule this out. A second concern is that,
given the sample structure of the dataset, the analysis focuses on relatively large
firms. Italian firms are generally small and family run and my results might not
necessarily extrapolate to the universe of Italian firms, most of which may differ
deeply from the ones considered in this chapter. Similarly, the external validity of
our findings is limited by the peculiarity of the Italian labor market. These results




Figure 3.1: Average number of new co-workers per year
Notes: Author’s calculations on INPS data for the period 1990-




Table 3.1: Probability of taking sick leave by worker and job characteristics
Sick leave=1 (%) N







South and Islands 13.22 345,798
Foreign 16.16 11,142
Panel B: Jobs’ characteristics
Low wage 14.06 545,017
High wage 12.69 545,017
White collar 4.41 382,922
Blue collar 18.23 707,112
Full time 13.46 1,036,143
Part time 11.73 53,891
North 14.14 844,833
Center 12.95 224,581
South and Islands 10.55 238,759
Small firm 13.77 746,814
Large firm 12.53 343,220
Paid months (≤ 6) 5.94 327,803
Paid months (> 6) 16.58 762,231
Low tenure 10.81 550,798
High Tenure 16.00 539,236
Low experience 15.00 601,576
High experience 12.05 488,458
Total number of obs 1,090,034
Notes: Author’s calculations on Italian social security data. The table reports summary
statistics for the period 1990-2002. All figures are means. Tenure is defined as the number
of years the worker was employed in the same firm in the sample window. Experience
is defined as the number of years the worker was in the labour market in the sample
period. Wages are expressed as gross monthly wages (in Euros) in real terms. Low tenure,
experience, wage and younger workers are defined as below the median. Small and large




Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics. Movers and incumbents samples
Incumbents Movers
Panel A: Workers’ characteristics
Sick leave (%) 14.76 6.98
Males (%) 61.43 59.90
Age 38.91 31.99
North (%) 65.93 62.27
Center (%) 17.81 15.63
South and Islands (%) 30.31 28.68
Foreign (%) 0.71 0.66
Panel B: Jobs’ characteristics
Wage 2,825.77 1,892.66
White collars (%) 46.91 37.88
Full time (%) 95.78 92.23
North (%) 83.42 85.12
Center (%) 20.58 18.91
South and Islands (%) 16.05 14.39
N. of co-workers in the sample 28.06 27.70
Paid months 10.32 5.27
Tenure (years) 3.48 0
Experience (years) 5.37 4.11
N 58,667 30,222
Notes: See table 3.1.
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Table 3.3: The effect of movers’ sick leave on incumbents’ absenteeism
Worker sick leave:
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Co-workers sick leave 0.023* 0.024* 0.024* 0.024*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Time fixed effects X X X X
Individual-Establishment FE X X X X
Background characteristics X X X
Number of movers (dummies) X X
Months of exposure to movers (dummies) X
N 58,667 58,667 58,667 58,667
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered (at the establishment level) standard errors in parenthesis.
Incumbents’ lagged characteristics include: sick leave, age and gender dummies, province of
birth dummies, occupation dummies (28 categories, as coded by INPS), monthly log wage,
dummies for total number of co-workers in the sample, years of tenure, years of experience,
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